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TXO v. Alliance: Due Process Limits and
Introducing a Defendant's Wealth When
Determining Punitive Damages Awards
It has been said that punitive damages cannot be permitted to run
wild.' Studies have shown, however, that punitive damages are indeed out
of control.2 Punitive damages are being sought after and awarded in a
growing number of cases.' Along with their growth in number, punitive
damages awards over the last twenty-five years have increased in size
between 300 and 1500%.' In particular, the average punitive damages
award in a personal injury case increased 13,700% between 1965 and
1984.5
The increasing number of cases in which punitive damages have been
awarded has led to a corresponding increase in the number of punitive
damages awards reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.6 Recently,
the Supreme Court has been presented with the issue of whether punitive
damages violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
More particularly, defendants have claimed that both procedural and
substantive due process have been violated by the excessive size of
punitive damages awards and the manner in which the amounts of the
1. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (articulating the concern of the United
States Supreme Court that punitive damages are running wild).
2. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1,
23 (1990) (summarizing recent studies from the RAND Corporation which show that the level of punitive
damages has increased in recent years).
3. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 2 n.6 (1982).
4. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 2, at 23 (summarizing a RAND Corporation Institute for Civil
Justice report which found that punitive damages awards in San Francisco, California, climbed from an average
of $95,000 in 1964-69 to $381,000 in 1980-84, a 300% increase). The study also showed that punitive damages
awards in Cook County, Illinois, increased from a 1965-69 average of $43,000 to $729,000 in 1980-84, an
increase of 1500%. Id. See generally AMERIcAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, PUNITIVE DAMAGES UPDATE,
RELEVANT STUDIES ON TORT REFORMIPUNITIVE DAMAGES (1989).
5. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 2, at 23 (stating that the average personal injury award increased
from $14,000 in 1965-69 to $1,934,000 in 1980-84). The report also noted that business and contract punitive
damages awards went from $97,000 to $624,000, an increase of 543%. Id
6. See infra note 65 (discussing punitive damages cases which have recently been heard by the United
States Supreme Court).
7. Id; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring that a person's life, liberty and property shall not
be denied without due process of law); see infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Due Process
Clauses of boon the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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awards were established Although the Supreme Court has ruled on
punitive damages twice in three years, lower courts have yet to receive
adequate guidance with respect to what limits are imposed on these awards
by procedural and substantive due process.' In light of the lack of
constitutional standards set by the Supreme Court, many states have
enacted statutes which have attempted to regulate the size of punitive
damages awards.'"
The recent decision in 7XO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp.," presented the United States Supreme Court with another
opportunity to clarify the due process limits on punitive damages. In TXO,
the Court affirmed a punitive damages award which was 526 times the
amount of the actual damages.' 2 Ironically, this holding came just two
years after the Court found that a punitive damages award, four times the
amount of actual damages, was close to the line of a constitutionally
allowable punitive damages award.1 3 In affirming the punitive damages
award in TXO, the United States Supreme Court again failed to clarify the
limits which substantive due process imposes on punitive damages.' 4 The
Court may have also confused lower courts by ratifying an award so much
larger than the four-to-one punitive damages award which was previously
deemed to be close to the line of constitutionality.
This Note explores the effects that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in TXO will have on state court review of punitive damages. Part
8. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (describing the use of procedural and substantive due
process as tools to attack punitive damages).
9. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct 2711, 2725 (1993) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (discussing the need for criteria to judge the substantive and
procedural limits which should be placed on punitive damages awards); id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing the need to have substantive and procedural guidance for trial courts and juries to follow when
levying punitive damages awards).
10. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (outlining various state statutes which regulate the amount
of punitive damages awards).
11. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
12. Id. at 2721 (Stevens, J., plurality); see id. at 2714 (stating that the judgment against TXO for $19,000
in actual damages, and $10 million in punitive damages does not violate constitutional due process).
13. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (stating that the punitive damages
award against Pacific Mutual was close, but did not cross the line of constitutionality even though it was greater
than four times the amount of the compensatory damages and 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of Haslip);
see also id at 6 n.2 (stating that the award consisted of $200,000 in actual damages, and $840,000 in punitive
damages); infra notes 74-106 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme Court decision in
Haslip).
14. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating
that courts are still without any standard by which to analyze punitive damages awards); id. at 2731-32
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the plurality did not set forth any guideposts for lower courts to
evaluate punitive damages awards).
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I of this Note reviews the historical background, introduction into
American jurisprudence, and appearance in recent United States Supreme
Court decisions of punitive damages.15 Part IE summarizes the facts of
TXO and discusses the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions.16
Finally, Part III explores the legal ramifications of the Court's decision and
the future of constitutional review of punitive damages under the Due
Process Clause.
17
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The development of punitive damages has spanned many centuries,
with its roots traced to the legal codes of many ancient civilizations.18
Throughout history, the primary purposes of punitive damages have been
to punish and deter wrongdoers for outrageous conduct.19 These purposes
for punitive damages remain the same today as they were hundreds of
15. See infra notes 18-113 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 114-204 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 205-276 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying test (discussing the appearance of punitive damages in many
ancient laws).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979); see id § 908 cmt. b (stating that the defendant's
act must be outrageous, because the acts are done for a wrongful purpose or intent, or in reckless indifference
to the rights of others). Punitive damages are not awarded for inadvertence, mistake or errors in judgment which
constitute ordinary negligence. Id; see id. (recognizing that punitive damages are not intended to compensate
the injured, but rather to punish the tortfeasor); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)
(stating that punitive damages are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
its future occurrence); Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 110, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350, 284 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320
(1991) (finding that the purposes of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer and to protect society from
future misconduct); Ellis, sapra note 3, at 3 (stating that the purposes for imposing punitive damages include
punishment, deterring the defendant from repeating the offense, deterring others, preserving the peace, inducing
private law enforcement, compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses, and paying the plaintiff's
attorney's fees). Ellis states that punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant acts maliciously,
willfully, wantonly, recklessly, or with conscious disregard toward others. Id. at 20. But see id. at 63 (noting that
an employer can be held liable for the wrongful acts of employees under respondeat superior without acting with
malice, wantonness or recklessness); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 3 (1979) (hereinafter ACTL
REPORT) (opining that punitive damages awards often reflect merely the jury's desire to punish without the
thought of the harm threatened by the defendant). See generally Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447
(Pa. 1946) (discussing the reckless disregard for others standard in a criminal homicide case); Commonwealth
v. Carroll 194 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 1963) (discussing the willful and intentional factor in a criminal homicide
case); LINDA L. SCHLuETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 24-31 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the
purposes of punitive damages); Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive
Damages Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 69-70 (1992) (discussing the rationale of punitive
damages).
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years ago.2° The deterrence and punishment purposes of punitive
damages, highlighted in early common law, established a foundation for
the use of punitive damages in the modem common law system.
A. The Birth of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages have been a part of legal history since approximately
2000 B.C., when the Code of Hammurabi was established in Babylon.2
Hammurabi's Code used the concept of multiple damages to penalize a
wrongdoer.22 Multiple damages were assessed by multiplying the actual
harm of a wrongdoer's acts by a specific numeric factory.2 For example,
Hammurabi's Code required the forfeiture of thirty oxen for the theft of
one ox from a temple or palace.24 The Covenant Code of the Hebrews,
in the Old Testament's Book of Exodus, also contains the concept of
awarding multiple damages for certain enumerated crimes2 In the
Covenant Code, the crimes of theft, trespass and killing of another's
livestock require multiple damages.26 The Decemviral and Justinian
Codes, the controlling laws of the Roman Empire from approximately 500
B.C. to 500 A.D., enumerated crimes which were punishable with multiple
damages.27 The Roman Codes were also the first instance where punitive
20. Compare supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of punitive damages) with
infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text (recognizing the purposes of punitive damages in early English
common law to be punishment and deterrence).
21. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1262
(discussing the ancient roots of punitive damages); Shores, supra note 19, at 62-63 (discussing the emergence
of punitive damages in ancient codes).
22. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 3 (stating that multiple damages are like punitive damages
because they provide an award greater than the actual harm).
23. Id.
24. CODE OF HAMMURABI § 8 (2000 B.C.), reprinted in SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 3-4
& n.1; see SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 3-4 n.1 (outlining various sections from Hammurabi's Code
which awarded multiple damages for crimes, including theft, fraud, loss of goods by a common carrier and
merchants cheating their agents); see also Owen, supra note 21, at 1262 n.17 (stating that multiple damages were
clearly a form of punitive damages since the awards were given to the plaintiff in legislatively prescribed
multiples of the actual damages).
25. Exodus 22:1, 7, 9 (Revised Standard Version); see id. 21:12, 15-17, 22:18-19 (stating that murder,
kidnapping, striking or cursing at your mother or father, witchcraft and bestiality are capital crimes); see also
SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 4 & n.7 (discussing multiple damages under Mosaic law and the
Covenant Code); Shores, supra note 19, at 63 & nn.10-11 (remarking on Biblical references to multiple
damages).
26. Exodus 22:1, 7, 9 (Revised Standard Version).
27. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 4-5 (stating that punitive damages in the Roman Empire
were awarded for the crimes of breach of promise, usury, theft, robbery and personal insult); id. at 6 (stating
that initially, Roman law required the penalty to be paid in kind, but later, the law developed into paying the
penalty in the form of monetary damages). Punitive damages are also found in other ancient codes. See id. at
1194
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damages were levied for intentional and outrageous acts of insult to
another person.28 The ancient concept of penalizing a wrongdoer for bad
acts in excess of the actual damages was next adopted in the early English
common law.
1. The Development of Punitive Damages in Early English
Common Law
The roots of punitive damages in England date back to the Norman
Conquest in 1066, and the system of amercements which developed soon
thereafter.29 Amercements were payments made to the King and other
injured parties, to compensate for the payor's wrongdoing, often in excess
of the actual damages.3 The Magna Carta,31 which was a charter of
English civil liberties first issued in 1215, regulated amercements by
requiring a jury to grant them, and requiring the amount of the amercement
to reflect the gravity of the offense and the wrongdoer's wealth. 2 The
policies and principles expressed in the Magna Carta are recognized, even
today, in England and the United States.33
Punitive damages continued to develop during the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth centuries to avenge victims whose honor had been violated by
a wrongdoer, and who were likely to seek retaliation.34 Early punitive
3-4 (noting that the Hittite Law in 1400 B.C. and the Hindu Code of Manu in 200 B.C. employed punitive or
multiple damages); id. 4 nn.3-4 (detailing various sections of the Hittite and Hindu Codes dealing with punitive
or multiple damages).
28. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 6.
29. See Shores, supra note 19, at 64-65 (stating that amercements were created to replace a previous
system where wrongdoers were required to buy back their good graces by making payments to the victim and
his family, the lord of the victim, the church in the area in which the crime took place, any other lord who had
an interest in the incident, and the King).
30. IX.
31. See 7 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNCA, MICROPEDIA 673 (15th ed. 1991) (describing the Magna
Carta as the English "Great Charter" of liberties granted by King John in 1215, against the threat of civil war,
which became a symbol against oppression by the King). For the full translated text of the Magna Carta, see
id. at 674-76.
32. See MAGNA CARTA, cl. 20 (stating that the level of the amercement depended on the gravity of a
person's offense, and was decided by ajury consisting of good men from the neighborhood); see also Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 268-73 (1989) (discussing the development of punitive
damages from concepts in the Magna Carta). The Magna Carta required amercements to be genuine harms
against the Crown, be proportional to the wrong committed, not be so large as to deprive someone of their
livelihood, and be fixed by a jury consisting of peers of the accused. Id. at 271.
33. See BRITANNICA, supra note 31, at 673 (discussing the survival of principles from the Magna Carta
in modem American and English jurisprudence).
34. Ellis, supra note 3, at 15; see Shores, supra note 19, at 66 (stating that punitive damages were
designed to force the defendant to bear the full social cost of the defendant's acts, and to avoid plaintiff's self-
help measures such as duels and feuds).
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damages awards were granted mainly for the wrongs of slander, seduction,
malicious prosecution, trespass into private dwellings or land, and criminal
conversion.35 In the 1700's, legal precedent was established which
allowed punitive damages to be awarded to punish the wrongdoer for
malice, oppression, gross fraud, or outrageous actions.
36
In 1763, the English Court of Common Pleas decided two cases, Wilkes
v. Wood37 and Huckle v. Money,38 which are viewed as the English
common law origin of modem punitive damages awards. 39 In Wilkes v.
Wood, Lord Chief Justice Pratt upheld a punitive damages award in an
action for trespass against the King's agents, who, with only a general
warrant, entered Wilkes' house and seized private papers.4° The Lord
Chief Justice stated that damages, which were greater than the actual injury
to the plaintiff, could be awarded not only to satisfy the injured person, but
to punish the guilty party and to deter similar future conduct.4' Similarly,
in Huckle v. Money, punitive damages were awarded when Huckle was
wrongly assaulted and imprisoned by the King's men.42 Lord Chief
Justice Pratt affirmed the punitive damages award to punish arbitrary use
of power by the government, even though Huckle had been treated very
well and suffered little, if any, actual damages.43 The court also granted
great deference to the decision of the jury, stating that only a glaring error
could reverse the jury's award of punitive damages because of the danger
of judges becoming involved in setting the damages for torts.44 The
Wilkes and Huckle cases expressed the purposes of punitive damages as
punishment and deterrence, concepts which were adopted into the newly
formed American legal system.
35. Ellis, supra note 3, at 15.
36. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 6-7.
37. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
38. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
39. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 6 (stating that these two related cases make use of
punitive damages for the first time). According to Schlueter and Redden, punitive damages were also developed
to justify excessive jury verdicts, compensate a plaintiff for mental anguish, compensate a plaintiff for other
intangible harms, deter future similar actions, redress unequal punishments between civil and criminal laws, and
allow revenge. Id. at 8-12. See generally id. at 8-12 (outlining theories of why punitive damages were created),
40. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489.
41. it at 489-90.
42. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
43. Ma.; see id. (stating that while in custody, the plaintiff was treated to beef-steaks and beer, and
therefore suffered little or no injury). The court noted that the award was aimed against the arbitrary power of
the King's agents, which was used in this case to produce evidence under a nameless warrant. Id. at 769.
44. Id at 769; see Shores, supra note 19, at 67-68 (discussing generally the holdings of Wilkes and
Huckle as cornerstone cases for common law punitive damages); id. at 68 (noting that Huckle was the first case
to use the term "exemplary damages").
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2. The Early American Development of Punitive Damages
One of the earliest cases to report punitive damages in the United
States is the 1784 case of Genay v. Norris.45 In Genay, the jury awarded
punitive damages to Genay after Norris, a physician, drugged Genay's
wine and caused him to become very ill.46 The South Carolina Supreme
Court found that the plaintiff deserved punitive damages due to the wanton
and outrageous actions of the defendant.47 Another early American case
was Coryell v. Cobaugh,41 in which a punitive damages award was
granted because the defendant breached a promise of marriage after
impregnating the plaintiff.49 The New Jersey Supreme Court instructed
the jury that they could give punitive damages to prevent such offenses in
the future. The cases of Genay and Coryell illustrate how the ancient
and English purposes for punitive damages, to punish and deter outrageous
conduct, were adopted in the United States.51 These purposes for punitive
damages have become a fixture in American jurisprudence. 2
By the 1850's, the United States Supreme Court stated that punitive
damages were a well established part of the common law. 3. The Court
noted that even though there was debate as to the propriety of the punitive
damages doctrine, the fact that punitive damages had been used for more
45. 1 S.C. 3 (1784); see Owen, supra note 21, at 1263 (discussing the emergence of punitive damages
in America).
46. Genay, I S.C. at 3; see id. (stating that the defendant had put the drug into the plaintiff's wine as a
practical joke).
47. Id.
48. 1 NJ. 77 (1791).
49. Id at 77; see SCmumTER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 15 (noting that the jury in Coryell was
charged not to estimate damages on the suffering or loss of the plaintiff, but to give damages for example's
sake); Shores, supra note 19, at 68-69 (discussing Coryell as one of the earliest American decisions discussing
punitive damages).
50. Coryell, 1 NJ. at 77-78. The debate began early in the United States as to the validity of punitive
damages. Compare Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) (stating that punitive damages are an unjust and
absurd solution to civil actions) and id (opining that the idea of punitive damages is wrong, and that it deforms
the law) with Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wis. 1914) (arguing that punitive damages elevate the role of
the jury, discourage revenge, vindicate the rights of the weak, and encourage the use of the courts by persons
who had been injured or wronged).
51. See supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text (discussing the development of punitive damages in
America and England).
52. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of punitive damages).
53. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); see id at 371 (stating that in actions of trespass
or torts, a jury may inflict exemplary, punitive or vindication damages by measuring the enormity of the
defendant's actions).
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than a century established them as part of the law.54 While the purposes
of punitive damages seem sound on their face, many well-defined
arguments have been presented in support of, and in opposition to the use
of punitive damages.5
B. The Debate on Punitive Damages
Opponents of punitive damages argue that punitive damages are merely
an addition to actual damages, are often awarded based on faulty jury
instructions, and violate constitutionally protected privileges such as due
process.5 6 Punitive damages opponents also argue that punitive damages
cause an unfair windfall effect which allows a plaintiff to receive awards
in excess of the plaintiffs actual damages.5 Proponents of punitive
damages rebut these arguments by stressing that punitive damages serve
the purposes of deterrence and punishment, thereby encouraging safer
practices and products.5 Supporters of punitive damages also argue that
punitive damages are not likely to be excessive, or a product of passion or
prejudice, because the ability to reduce the award is available under certain
circumstances. 9
Opposition to punitive damages has had an impact, though, as
evidenced by the scrutiny which state legislators have placed on punitive
damages through increased tort reform legislation. 6 Some states have
54. See id at 371 (holding that exemplary damages are to be based on the enormity of the defendant's
offense rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff); see also Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 17 (1991) (affirming the common law method of assessing punitive damages); Lake Shore Ry. v. Pretice,
147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893) (holding that punitive damages are not awarded to compensate the sufferer, but to
punish the offender and deter others).
55. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (describing many of the arguments for and against
punitive damages).
56. Thomas W. Ladd, Haslip and Beyond: The Future of Punitive Damages, FOR THE DEFENSE, May
1991, at 3; see infra notes 91-94 and 184-198 and accompanying text (discussing claims from Haslip and TXO
for faulty jury instructions); infra note 64 (outlining constitutional arguments which have been brought against
punitive damages).
57. See Jackson Williams, Removing the Windfall Effect from Punitive Damages, FOR THE DEFENSE, May
1993, at 27 (arguing against punitive damages windfalls).
58. Ladd, supra note 56, at 3; see infra note 19 and accompanying text (outlining the purposes of
punitive damages).
59. Ladd, supra note 56, at 3; see CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 662.5 (West 1976) (stating that if a new trial
is granted on the grounds of excessive damages, the trial court may grant the new trial subject to the condition
that the motion for new trial will be denied if the party who won the favorable judgment consents to a reduction
in the amount of the award).
60. See Shores, supra note 19, at 84-87 (discussing tort reform legislation in various states); Williams,
supra note 57, at 30 (outlining state statutes addressing windfall damages); infra notes 61-62 and accompanying
text (discussing recent legislation used by states to reform the punitive damages award system).
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placed caps on punitive damages, while others have expressly eliminated
punitive damages altogether.61 Many states have also addressed the
windfall effect by reducing the amount of punitive damages which a
plaintiff may collect.62 Nevertheless, the theory which has been employed
most recently, and throughout this century, to attack punitive damages in
61. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993) (stating that punitive damages may not exceed $250,000, unless
the punitive damages award is based on a pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct, actual malice or
libel, slander or defamation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(l)(a), 3(a)-(b) (1987) (stating that a punitive
damages award may not exceed the amount of actual damages unless willful and wanton conduct is present, and
then the sum is not to exceed three times the amount of actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a) (West
Supp. 1993) (stating that in specified proceedings, the award of punitive damages may not exceed three times
the amount of the actual damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (Michie Supp. 1993) (stating that punitive
damages awards are limited to $250,000, unless the award is based on products liability cases or the defendant
acted with specific intent to cause harm); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp. 1994)
(stating that except in cases of malice or intentional torts, punitive damages cannot exceed four times the amount
of the actual damages, or $200,000, whichever is greater); see also ACTL REPORT, supra note 19, at 15
(suggesting that punitive damages awards be limited to twice the amount of actual damages or $250,000,
whichever is greater). The ACTL Report also suggests that jurors not be told of the limits so that the jurors may
not circumvent the punitive damages instructions by simply awarding larger compensatory damage amounts. Id.
New Hampshire does not allow punitive damages as a punishment to the defendant or as a warning and
example to deter others from committing like offenses in the future. See Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d
66, 67-68 (N.H. 1972); see also Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) (finding that the idea of punitive
damages is wrong, and deforms the symmetry of the body of the law).
62. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (allocating one-third of punitive damages awards to
the state fund); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that 65% of a punitive damages award
is payable to the claimant, while 35% is payable to various state agencies); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2)
(Michie Supp. 1993) (requiring that 75% of punitive damages awards be awarded to the state); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A.l(2)(a)-(b) (West 1987) (stating that an amount of the punitive damages award, not to exceed 25%, is
paid to the claimant unless the defendant's conduct was directed specifically toward the claimant, in which case
the claimant shall receive all of the punitive damages award); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1993)
(maintaining that the state and the plaintiff each receive 50% of the punitive damages award); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.675(2) (Vernon 1988) (maintaining that one half of all punitive damages awards be received by the state);
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. LAW § 8605 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (requiring that 20% of a punitive damages award
is payable to the state); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1993) (stating that the plaintiff and the state each receive 50%
of the punitive damages award); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (stating that 50% of punitive damages
in excess of $20,000, are paid to the state); see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that punitive damages awards should be paid to the state instead of the plaintiff); Bass v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654,,672 (1877) (suggesting that a plaintiff should not receive any additional
punitive damages after his injury has been fully compensated). But see Tudor Associates v. AJ & AJ Servicing,
Inc., 1993 WL 564720 at *12 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (stating that it is morally wrong for punitive damages awards
to be paid to the plaintiff and not the state, because a criminal penalty would have been paid to the state);
McBride v. GMC, 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding Georgia Code § 51-12-5.1(e)(2)
unconstitutional as a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Georgia and federal constitutions); ACTL
REPORT, supra note 19, at 19-20 (arguing that windfall benefits of punitive damages should go to no other
person or entity other than the plaintiff to assure that attorneys will continue to take cases which involve punitive
damages). See generally Shores, supra note 19, at 85-86 (discussing state legislation limiting the amount of a
punitive damages award which a plaintiff may recover). See supra note 57 and accompanying text (defining the
windfall effect caused by punitive damages).
1199
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
the United States Supreme Court has been the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3
C. Analyzing Punitive Damages Under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause
The evolution of punitive damages has been hampered by challenges
against the propriety of punitive damages awards. Not only have punitive
damages been challenged and reformed at the state level, but punitive
damages have been attacked by numerous constitutional inquiries.64 The
63. See Seaboard Air Lines Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 76 (1907) (upholding a damage award of
$50 against a common carrier when the actual damages from a claim for lost property against a common carrier
had been a mere $1.75). In affirming the award, the United States Supreme Court noted that substantive due
process sets limits beyond which penalties cannot go, but still upheld the damage award in question. Id. at 78.
The Court did not outline any test for defining what the limits were, but stated that the penalty was not too large
to make the award unreasonable. Id.; see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)
(stating that the United States Supreme Court can only interfere with legislatively imposed punitive fines if they
are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law); Standard Oil Co.
of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912) (stating that punitive damages can be assessed in civil cases for
punishment, and need not be compensatory). The Court in Standard Oil, stated that the legislative power of the
state should determine the limit beyond which punitive damages may not go. Id. at 286-87; see Southwestern
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 485 (1915) (holding that an Arkansas statute which imposed a fine
of $100 per day on a phone company for not rendering equal service to customers was unconstitutional). The
Danaher Court found that the penalty could be reversed on substantive due process grounds because it was
plainly arbitrary and oppressive. Id at 491; see St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 63-65
(1919) (affirming a punitive damages award against a rail carrier for overcharging travel rates). The Supreme
Court, in Williams, stated that the defendant's due process rights were not violated even though the award went
to the aggrieved passengers and not the state. Id. at 66.
64. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at 45-70. Punitive damages have been attacked through
the use of many constitutional clauses, including the First Amendment, Confrontation, Self Incrimination, Double
Jeopardy, Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses. Id.
The imposition of punitive damages has been challenged as a threat to free speech under the First
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting government from making a law abridging the freedom of
speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (stating that the First Amendment prohibits
defamation plaintiffs from receiving punitive damages without a showing of actual malice). Jury discretion to
award punitive damages unnecessarily increases the danger of media self-censorship. Id. at 350; see Saunders
Hardware Five & Ten, Inc. v. Low, 307 So. 2d 893, 893-94 (Fla. App. 1974) (holding that in an action for libel
or slander, upon some proof of malicious publication, the plaintiff may recover punitive damages); cf. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (stating that private persons can receive
punitive damages awards when injured by speech of a non-public nature without showing actual malice).
Punitive damages have also been challenged under the Confrontation Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(providing that an accused shall enjoy the right to confront witnesses against him); Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119,
121 (Colo. 1884) (stating that there is a right to confront adverse witnesses in an action which includes punitive
damages); cf United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475,481 (1896) (maintaining that the Confrontation Clause only
relates to prosecutions which are criminal in nature).
Self incrimination is another theory which has been employed against punitive damages. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V (maintaining that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself). Unlike criminal trials,
in civil proceedings for punitive damages, a defendant cannot refuse to give testimony. Comment, Criminal
Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cli. L. REv. 408, 430-33 (1967) (discussing the policy
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Supreme Court has been presented arguments based on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause questioning the constitutionality of
punitive damages.6 ' Before examining recent applications of the Due
Process Clause to punitive damages, it is important to understand the
modem meaning and use of the Due Process Clause.
1. The Modem Meaning of the Due Process Clause
The United States Constitution establishes that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.6 Due
process is divided into the concepts of procedural due process and
substantive due process.67 Procedural due process sets constitutional limits
on the enforcement of legislation or other governmental actions. 8
Traditionally, the concept of procedural due process has stood for the
behind the right against self incrimination as a protection against government abuse, concluding that the Self
Incrimination Clause does not apply to punitive damages).
The Double Jeopardy Clause has been advanced as protecting a defendant from both criminal and punitive
damages sanctions. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (maintaining that no person shall be subject to being twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852) (finding that punitive damages
may be assessed for a wrong which has potential criminal liability); cf Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 120-21
(1884) (maintaining that conduct that is punishable criminally cannot be subject to punitive damages, and vice
versa).
The Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses have been used to challenge the amount
of a state imposed punitive damages award. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that excessive fines shall not
be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-67 (1977)
(maintaining that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to non-criminal settings); Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not
limit an award of punitive damages in a civil suit between private parties).
65. See Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 277 (refusing to rule whether a punitive damages award was
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because the state court record on the topic was not complete);
Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-78 (1988) (refusing to address the claim that the
punitive damages award in the case violated the Due Process Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Excessive
Fines Clause because the defendant had failed to bring these claims at the trial court level); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (stating that the constitutionality of punitive damages is an important
issue which must be resolved, but that the Court would not rule on the matter because other aspects of the
holding had made the decision on due process unnecessary).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV, § 1; see LAwRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTnUtONAL LAw 663
(2d ed. 1988) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government, while the Fourteenth
applies to the states); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884) (analogizing due process to the
Magna Carta's guarantees against government oppression and usurpation).
67. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 664 & n.4.
68. Id. at 664; see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908) (prohibiting procedures which abridge
any fundamental principle of liberty and justice which are contained in the idea of free government).
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safeguards which assure that a person is granted notice and an adequate
hearing before incurring any loss of life, liberty, or property.
69
Substantive due process, on the other hand, analyzes the constitutional
limits on the content of legislation."' Substantive due process was first
used to attack state economic legislation which infringed on a person's
freedom to contract.7 Modem substantive due process has been used
mainly to uphold fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy, which
has also been interpreted to be a liberty interest protected under the Due
Process Clause.72
Both procedural and substantive due process are used to challenge
punitive damages. For example, procedural due process is used to attack
punitive damages by challenging the sufficiency of jury instructions
regarding the purpose of punitive damages.73 Substantive due process is
used to argue whether the correct standard of review is applied in
69. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 664; see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (requiring that
an accused receive a hearing before being deprived of property); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (avouching the right to be heard before suffering any
grievous loss of any kind whether or not it involves the stigma and hardship of a criminal conviction); Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (maintaining that a fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity
to be heard); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267 (1870) (finding that a person has a right
to notice and a hearing whether in a criminal proceeding or not).
70. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 664 nA.
71. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking down a New York law which limited
the number of hours that bakery workers could work as an abridgement of the liberty to contract); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (representing the first time that the Court used substantive due process to
invalidate a state statute for imposing on a person's liberty right found in the Due Process Clause); TRIBE, supra
note 66, at 570-74 (discussing how strict scrutiny was applied by the Lochner Court in overturning the economic
regulations).
In the late 1930s, the standard of review for evaluating economic legislation changed to rational basis
scrutiny. See U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (sustaining a federal prohibition on the
interstate shipment of filled milk products against a substantive due process challenge). The Court in Carolene
Products stated that facts supporting the legislative judgment were to be presumed, and that legislation on
economic regulations would be valid unless it did not have some rational basis. Id. at 152-53. This created the
standard of review for economic regulations as minimum rationality coupled with a presumption of constitutional
validity toward the legislature. Id; see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (stating that if
there was any way in which legislators might have concluded that some legislative action was rationally related
to its means, then it was considered valid, thus creating an extremely high deference to legislative actions in
economic legislation).
72. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (holding that strict scrutiny is to be used in
protecting fundamental rights, in this case the fundamental right to marry); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut law which forbade the use of contraceptives). The
Griswold majority stated that the right to use contraception is within the right to privacy, which is found in a
penumbra of rights protected by the Bill of Rights. l at 484; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06
(1977) (striking down a city ordinance limiting the persons allowed to live together in a household to the nuclear
family). The Moore Court concluded that there exists a liberty interest in living together as a family and that
ordinances preventing extended families from living together must be examined carefully. Id. at 499.
73. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the attack on the constitutionality of jury
instructions used in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip).
1202
1994 / TXO v. Alliance
determining if a punitive damages award is related to the amount of actual
injury committed by a defendant.74 Both of these due process claims were
presented in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hasip.75
2. Application of the Due Process Clause to Punitive Damages
Awards: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the United States
Supreme Court analyzed the limits on punitive damages awards under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 The Court found
that the system for reviewing punitive damages awards developed by the
Alabama Supreme Court was sufficient to satisfy both procedural and
substantive due process requirements and approved of their use in other
states.' The Supreme Court held that punitive damages awards must be
analyzed with general concerns of reasonableness, and be levied by a jury
which has received adequate guidance from the court.78
The facts of Haslip are straight-forward. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co., through an agent, sold a health insurance policy to Cleopatra
Haslip.7 9 The agent fraudulently misappropriated Haslip's premium
payments, which resulted in her insurance policy being canceled without
her knowledge.80 Haslip was subsequently hospitalized.81 Because she
had no insurance and could not afford to pay her medical bills, her credit
was adversely affected.82 Haslip brought suit against Pacific Mutual
claiming fraud, and the jury awarded a $1,040,000 verdict, of which
74. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of review used to analyze the
relationship of punitive damages to actual injury in Haslip).
75. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
76. I at 19-24.
77. Id at 24.
78. Id at 18.
79. Id. at 4; see id. (stating that in 1981, Lemmie L. Ruffin, a licensed insurance agent for Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co., sold group health insurance to Cleopatra Haslip, an employee of Roosevelt City, Alabama).
80. Id at 5; Arrangements were made for premium payments to be sent to Ruffin at Pacific Mutual's
Birmingham office each month through payroll deductions, which were submitted to Ruffin by the county clerk.
i Ruffin subsequently misappropriated most of the premium payments made to Pacific, and moreover, when
delinquency notices were sent to the respondents, Ruffin intercepted them. i As a result, the respondents were
unaware their health insurance policies had been canceled, I
81. hi; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 539 (Ala. 1990) (stating that Haslip incurred
$2500 in medical bills).
82. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 5. Upon her discharge, Haslip was required to make a payment upon her medical
bill because she could not prove that she had insurance to cover the medical expenses. Id. Haslip's medical bills
were sent to a collection agency by her physician after he was not paid. d; Haslip, 553 So. 2d at 539 (noting
that Haslip was required to pay $600 before the hospital would agree to discharge her).
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$840,000 was punitive in nature. 3 A divided Alabama Supreme Court
upheld the award, stating that Pacific Mutual's misrepresentations were not
an innocent mistake, but were intentional fraud.84 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine Pacific Mutual's claim that
the punitive damages award was unreasonably excessive and was a product
of unbridled jury discretion.85 The Court also granted certiorari to review
Alabama's punitive damages award procedure.86
The Supreme Court remarked that unlimited jury discretion, in
rendering punitive damages awards, can invite extreme results which
violate the Due Process Clause.87 The majority recognized, however, that
the Court need not, and could not, draw a mathematical "bright line"
between constitutional and unconstitutional punitive damages awards.88
Instead, the Court submitted that concerns of reasonableness and adequate
guidance are essential in testing the constitutionality of punitive
damages.8 ' The Court then examined Alabama's punitive damages
procedures, which were divided into three separate evaluations: adequate
jury instructions; post-trial review; and appellate level review of the
punitive damages award. 9'
The Court first analyzed the instructions given to the jury and noted
that the judge expressly instructed the jury that the purpose of punitive
damages was not to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant
and to deter future similar conduct.9 The instructions also noted that
punitive damages were not mandatory. 92 The Supreme Court recognized
83. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 5-7 & n.2. The case against Pacific Mutual was submitted to the jury under the
theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 6. The common law of Alabama makes a corporation liable for both
compensatory and punitive damages for the fraud of its employees, Id at 14. Pacific Mutual, and not Ruffin,
appealed the punitive damages on the ground that Pacific Mutual's substantive and procedural due process rights
were violated. Id. at 7. See Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927) (stating that making
the corporation liable for an agent's fraud, creates a strong incentive for vigilance by the corporation); British
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Simpson Sales Co., 93 So. 2d 763, 768 (Ala. 1957) (finding that an insurer is more likely to
prevent an agent's fraud if given sufficient financial incentive to do so).
84. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7; see ALA. CODE § 6-5-103 (1993) (noting that punitive damages are not
recoverable in Alabama for innocent or mistaken misrepresentation, but are recoverable for deceit or willful
fraud); Haslip, 553 So. 2d at 540 (concluding that Ruffin's fraud was intentional, gross, oppressive and
malicious).
85. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7-8.
86. Id
87. hId at 18.
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Id at 19-23.
91. Id. at 19; see id at 6 n.1 (listing the instructions given to the jury concerning punitive damages); see
also supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of punitive damages).
92. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6 n.l.
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that the instructions gave the jury wide discretion in their decision, but that
this discretion was limited to the policy purposes outlined by the trial
court.93 The Court concluded that since the discretion of the jury was
exercised within reasonable constraints as provided in the jury instructions,
procedural due process was satisfied as to the content of the
instructions.94
The Supreme Court next examined and approved of Alabama's post-
trial procedures for reviewing the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award.95 The factors Alabama analyzed in its post-trial review of punitive
damages were the culpability of the defendant's conduct, the desirability
of discouraging others from similar conduct, and the impact of the
defendant's actions upon the parties.96 These factors were found
appropriate by the Alabama Supreme Court, which required the trial judge
to reflect on the award and note in the record the reasons for upholding or
changing the award.97 The United States Supreme Court determined that
these factors ensured that a meaningful and adequate review would be
conducted by the trial court.98
Finally, the United States Supreme Court examined the review of the
punitive damages award conducted by the Supreme Court of Alabama to
assure substantive due process.99 To ensure that a punitive damages
award does not exceed the amount which would accomplish society's goals
of deterrence and punishment, the Supreme Court of Alabama established
a list of considerations for reviewing punitive damages at the appellate
level.' ° The factors include: the relationship between the punitive
damages award, and the harm which is likely to result, as well as the
actual harm; the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; any
93. Id. at 19.
94. Id at 19-20; id. (stating that the jury must consider the character and degree of the wrong done to
the plaintiff when deciding on the punitive damages which will deter future conduct).
95. Id at 20.
96. Id.; see Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (Ala. 1986) (setting forth the three
factors for post-trial review to be used by a trial court). The Hammond court stated that the factors were not
exclusive, and that justice could require looking at other factors such as the impact of the defendant's actions
on third parties. Id. at 1379. The Hammond court further noted that the purpose of the factors is to assist the
appellate courts in reviewing punitive damages cases. Id.
97. Haslip, 499 U.S. it 20.
98. Id. at 20; see Hammond, 493 So. 2d at 1379 (stating that a trial judge is better positioned than
appellate judges to review a punitive damages award, because the trial judge observes the parties and other facets
of a trial which are not captured in an appellate record).
99. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21.
100. Id. The factors used by the appellate court were developed in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218 (1989). See Green Oil at 223-24 (listing the seven factors used by the court in Haslip for reviewing punitive
damages awards).
1205
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 25
profit to the defendant from the wrongful conduct and the desire to take
away that profit; the financial position of the defendant; and the costs of
litigation."1 Alabama's factors also allowed the appellate court to
mitigate the punitive damages award so as to take account of any criminal
sanctions or other civil penalties levied against the defendant as a result of
the defendant's conduct.0 2 The United States Supreme Court concluded
that this substantive review, used by the Alabama Supreme Court, imposed
a definite and meaningful constraint on punitive damages awards to ensure
that the award was not grossly out of proportion with the severity of the
offense.103
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the punitive damages
award was four times the amount of the actual damages.' 4 The Court
noted, however, that the punitive damages award did not violate
constitutional due process because the award was issued following
specified objective criteria. 5 Even though it affirmed the punitive
damages award, the Court found the award to be close to the constitutional
line of allowable damages under substantive due process.1°6 Immediately
after the decision, lower courts applied the Haslip standards, which had a
substantial impact on due process challenges to punitive damages awards.
3. The Aftermath of the Haslip Decision
The effects of the Haslip decision were quickly felt in the nation's
courts. Only two weeks after the decision in Haslip, the United States
Supreme Court remanded seven cases for further proceedings in light of
101. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22. It should be noted that Alabama does not allow the trial to include
evidence of the defendant's wealth, but the appellate review includes this factor as relevant evidence in
reviewing punitive damages. Id
102. Id at 22; see id. (stating that these criteria impose a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint
on the fact finder).
103. Id
104. Id at 23.
'105. Id at 23-24; see supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (listing factors used by Alabama to test
the reasonableness of the punitive damages award).
106. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24.
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the standards approved in Haslip.1"7 Many punitive damages awards were
overturned by state and federal courts enlisting the Haslip criteria." 8
The procedural due process guidelines set forth in Haslip were applied
by courts to evaluate whether juries had been given sufficient
instructions, 9 and to determine whether adequate post trial review had
been granted.110 The substantive due process review from Haslip, which
ensures that awards are no larger than necessary to accomplish society's
goals of deterrence and punishment, was also used to reverse punitive
damages awards.' Some courts contended that the holding in Haslip
advanced a mathematical ratio of four to one when setting the ratio of
107. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 499 U.S. 914 (1991); Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Jordan, 499
U.S. 914 (1991); Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett v. Jones, 499 U.S. 914 (1991); International Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness v. George, 499 U.S. 914 (1991); Pacific Lighting Corp. v. MGW, Inc., 499 U.S. 915 (1991);
Portec, Inc. v. The Post Office, 499 U.S. 915 (1991); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Eichenseer, 499 U.S. 914 (1991).
108. See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (discussing cases overturned by courts using the
Haslip review standards).
109. See, e.g., Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 1991) (addressing a $100,000
punitive damages award which was levied against a plaintiff with a net worth of $6,428). The court stated that
the South Carolina jury instructions, which only instructed the jury that the punitive damages award could be
as large as necessary to punish and deter, were not sufficient under the Haslip factors. IdJ at 105; Union Nat'l
Bank of Little Rock v. Mosbacher, 933 F.2d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1991) (remanding a punitive damages award.
for consideration because the Arkansas jury instructions did no more than give the defendant's net worth and
explain that punitive damages are to punish and deter); see also supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text
(outlining jury instructions used in Haslip).
110. See Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338, 1348-50 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that "manifestly
or grossly excessive," the Virginia standard of review for punitive damages awards, was similar to the standards
of review used in Mississippi and Vermont which were rejected in Haslip, and thus was rejected as an
inappropriate means to review punitive damages awards); supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing
the post trial review outlined in Haslip). But see Las Palmas Assoc. v. Las Palmas Center Assoc., 235 Cal. App.
3d 1220, 1257, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 323 (2d Dist. 1991) (stating that the passion or prejudice standard used in
California to evaluate punitive damages in the post trial review is sufficient under the standard outlined by the
court in Haslip).
111. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790, 792-93 (Nev. 1991) (lowering a punitive damages
award from $22.5 million to $5 million after a compensatory damages award of $410,000 against an insurance
company refusing to pay a claim). The Hires court stated that even though the defendant acted in an oppressive
manner, the punitive damages award was clearly disproportionate to the blameworthiness and harmfulness of
the defendant's conduct. Id; see Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam Brown Co., 792 F. Supp. 1520, 1537 (W.D. Mo. 1992)
(vacating a punitive damages award of $2.7 million in a fraudulent misrepresentation case because the award
had no rational relationship to the harm likely to result or the harm which actually resulted from the defendant's
actions); supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive review developed in Haslip).
But see Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991), review subsequent to remand
from United States Supreme Court, 499 US. 914 (1991) (upholding a punitive damages award of $500,000
against a health insurer who wrongfully denied paying a claim, when the actual damages award was just $1,000).
The Eichenseer court stated that the punitive damages award was reasonable because the conduct of the
defendant was egregious, the defendant had a net worth of $157 million, and it was not the first time that
punitive damages had been levied against the defendant for similar wrongful actions. Id. at 1382-84 & n.9.
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punitive damages to compensatory damages." 2 In June 1993, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp."3 to once again review a due process
challenge to a punitive damages award, and to decide if the line of
constitutionality in the awarding of punitive damages had been crossed.
II. THE CASE
A. Factual and Procedural History
In 1984, TXO Production Corp. scientists concluded that extracting oil
and gas from under a tract of land, which at the time was possessed by
Alliance Resources Corp., would be extremely profitable.' 4  TXO
approached Alliance and offered to pay twenty dollars per acre in cash,
twenty-two percent of all oil and gas revenues in royalties, and all
development costs of oil and gas extraction for the tract." 5 The offer,
which was accepted by Alliance, stated that if TXO's attorneys determined
that the title on any part of the property failed, all consideration paid on
that part of the land would be returned to TXO." 6
Shortly after the agreement was executed, TXO's attorneys discovered
a 1958 deed by a predecessor in interest, Tug Fork Land Co., to a third
party, Leo J. Signaigo, Jr."7 The rights of Signaigo in the land were later
conveyed to Hawley Coal Mines Co., and then to Virginia Crews Coal
Co." 8 TXO unsuccessfully attempted to induce Signaigo to execute a
112. See Dunn v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F. Supp. 929, 951 (D.V. 1991) (reducing a punitive
damages award from $25 million to $2 million where the compensatory damages award was $500,000). The
court interpreted the holding of Haslip to stand for the proposition that a punitive damages to compensatory
damages ratio of greater than four to one would cross the line of constitutionality. Id. The award was reduced
to $1 million in a later proceeding which reviewed the case after TXO. Dunn v. Hovic, I F.3d 1371 (3d Cir.
1993); see supra notes 88-89, 104-106 and accompanying text (propounding that Haslip does not create a
mathematical bright line to be followed in evaluating punitive damages). But see Financial Servs. Co. of Ala.
v. Barbour, 592 So. 2d 191, 199 (Ala. 1991) (refusing to accept defendant's claim that Haslip advocated an
absolute limit to punitive damages as four or five times the amount of actual damages).
113. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
114. Id. at 2715 (Stevens, J., plurality); see id. (stating that TXO was engaged in oil and gas production
in 25 states).
115. Id The contract was for TXO to obtain Alliance's leasehold interest rights to develop oil and gas
resources under the tract. Id.
116. Id at 2715 & n.2. The offer was accepted in April 1985. Id at 2715.
117. Id at2715.
118. Id at 2715; see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 876-77 (,V.Va. 1992)
(finding that the 1958 deed was unambiguous and that Tug Fork, Alliance's predecessor in interest, retained all
the rights to the oil and gas under the tract).
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false affidavit which stated that the 1958 deed from Tug Fork may have
included oil and gas rights.119 TXO convinced Virginia Crews that
Virginia Crews had an interest in the oil and gas deposits under the tract,
and paid Virginia Crews $6000 for a quitclaim deed conveying to TXO
any interest it might have in the tract.120
After fraudulently dealing with Signaigo and Virginia Crews, and
recording the quitclaim deed, TXO informed Alliance of the possible
failure in title due to the deed acquired by TXO from Virginia Crews.'
By exposing the quitclaim deed, TXO attempted to force a renegotiation
of the royalties agreement with Alliance, in an effort to reduce the amount
of royalties to be paid. 2 When the negotiations proved unsuccessful,
TXO brought a declaratory judgment action for title to the oil and gas
deposits based on the quitclaim deed. 23 The West Virginia Supreme
Court, however, prohibited TXO from introducing evidence concerning the
meaning of the 1958 deed because the deed was unambiguous. 24 The
court decided that since Virginia Crews had no title to the oil and gas, the
quitclaim deed from Virginia Crews to TXO was a nullity, and Alliance
had title to the deposits. 12
Alliance counterclaimed for slander of title. 26 Alliance offered
evidence to the jury that TXO knew Alliance had good title to the oil and
gas deposits, and thus, acted in bad faith by advancing the declaratory
judgment on title. 27 Alliance also offered evidence of TXO's financial
status, that the expected revenues from the deposits under the tract were
substantial, and that TXO had engaged in similar nefarious activities in
119. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2715-16 (Stevens, J., plurality).
120. Id at 2715.
121. Id at 2716.
122. Id; see id (stating that other evidence showed that the only reason TXO advanced the deed was to
force Alliance to renegotiate the royalty arrangement).
123. Id An internal TXO memorandum was introduced which discussed the quitclaim deed as an
opportunity to acquire total interest in the oil and gas rights. Id. at 2715-16 n.6; see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 881 (W.Va. 1992) (maintaining that the acquisition and recording of the deed
by TXO was nothing less than an attempt to steal Alliance's land).
124. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716 (Stevens, J., plurality).
125. Id at 2716 & n.8.
126. Id at 2716; see TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 879 (deducing the elements of slander of title to entail:
publication of a false statement; derogatory to the plaintiff's title; with malice; and causing special damages as
a result of diminished value in the eyes of third parties).
127. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716 (Stevens, J., plurality); see supra note 122 and accompanying text (stating
that the only reason TXO advanced the fraudulently acquired deed was to force the renegotiation of the royalties
agreement with Alliance or to acquire the interests itself).
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other parts of the country.'28 The jury returned a verdict for Alliance
consisting of $19,000 in compensatory damages to cover Alliance's cost
in defending the action, and $10 million in punitive damages.'29 TXO
made motions for judgment not withstanding the verdict and remittitur,
claiming that its Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due
process rights had been violated by the punitive damages award. 3 ' In
particular, TXO claimed that the punitive damages award resulted from
jury instructions which lacked any requirement that the punitive damages
award bear a reasonable relationship to the actual injury.' The trial
court denied TXO's motions without opinion, and TXO appealed. 3 '
On appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, TXO
claimed that the award of punitive damages violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip.133 Nonetheless, the court upheld the award of
punitive damages, finding that the award did not violate the reasonable
relationship test which compares the penalty necessary to discourage future
similar conduct with the amount of the punitive damages award.3 4 The
court concluded that the potential damages from TXO's actions, the
reprehensibility of such actions, and the deterrence necessary to discourage
similar future fraudulent actions supported the award in this case. 135
Upon appeal by TXO, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether the punitive damages award violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, either because its amount was excessive,
or because it was a product of unfair jury prejudice. 36
In a plurality opinion by Justice Stevens and over the dissent of Justice
O'Connor, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, holding that the punitive
damages award assessed against TXO did not violate the Due Process
128. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716-17 & nn. 9-10 (Stevens, J., plurality); see id. at 2716 & n.9 (stating that
TXO is estimated to be worth between $2.2 billion and $2.5 billion); id. at 2717 & n.10 (outlining expert
testimony which found that the tract could support between 15 and 25 wells, with anticipated revenues as high
as $1.5 million from each well, totalling an income stream valued between $22.5 million and $37.5 million).
129. Id. at 2717 (Stevens, J., plurality).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2717-18 (Stevens, J., plurality).
135. Id. at 2718 (Stevens, J., plurality).
136. Id at 2714 (Stevens, J., plurality).
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Clause.137 In upholding the punitive damages award, the Court first
attempted to decide the appropriate standard of review for analyzing
punitive damages awards. 13  After deciding on an appropriate standard,
the Court proceeded to apply the standard to TXO's claim that its due
process rights had been violated.1 39 The Court also confronted the issue
of whether the content of the jury instructions was appropriate to afford
TXO its procedural due process rights." ° Justice Kennedy concurred in
the judgment, but noted that there might have been a different result had
this been a case of negligence, strict liability, or respondeat superior.'
Finally, Justice Scalia, while concurring in the judgment, argued that
punitive damages are not entitled to a substantive due process analysis at
all. 14
2
B. The Court Wrestles with the Substantive Due Process Standard of
Review
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that an excessive
punitive damages award can be set aside as a violation of substantive due
process. 143 Indeed, TXO asserted that the punitive damages award of ten
million dollars, which was 526 times the amount of the actual damages,
was excessive, and represented an arbitrary deprivation of property without
137. Id. at 2722-23 (Stevens, J., plurality). Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Blacknun. Id. Justice Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the decision. Id. at 2724 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment joined by Justice
Thomas. Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Justice White
and joined in part by Justice Souter. Id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2718-20 (Stevens, J., plurality); see infra notes 156-158 and accompanying text (formulating
the substantive standard of review to be used by the Court when reviewing punitive damages awards and
describing the basis of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy's disagreement with the standard adopted by the
plurality).
139. 7X0, 113 S. CL at 2721-23 (Stevens, J., plurality); see infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text
(applying the grossly excessive standard of review to the facts of TXO).
140. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723-24 (Stevens, J., plurality); see infra notes 184-198 and accompanying text
(addressing the procedures used by West Virginia when reviewing punitive damages).
141. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see infra note
173 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion on the subject of negligent, strict
liability, or respondeat superior).
142. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see infra notes 199-204 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's concurring opinion).
143. TXO, 113 S. Ct at 2718 (Stevens, J., plurality). Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that an
award may be so excessive as to violate due process and that a rigid formula for determining the constitutionality
of punitive damages should not be adopted. Id. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 63 and
accompanying text (discussing Seaboard and Waters-Pierce as cases where the Court found that there were
substantive limits to punitive damages penalties).
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due process of law.'" To aid the Court in establishing the correct
standard of review for substantive due process, both Alliance and TXO
presented tests for determining when a punitive damages award is
excessive.'45
Alliance argued that rational basis scrutiny, which is used to review
economic legislation, is the correct standard for review. 4 6 TXO, on the
other hand, argued that a stricter level of scrutiny should be employed
because punitive damages are assessed without guidance from the
legislature or elected officials. 47 TXO also asserted that objective
criteria, such as jurisdictional comparisons of punitive damages awards,
should be used to determine whether the awarded punitive damages are
fundamentally unfair to the defendant. 48 Although the Court recognized
the parties' desire to formulate a test to determine when a punitive
damages award is grossly excessive, neither formula was found
satisfactory. 14
9
The Supreme Court rejected Alliance's proposal of the rational basis
standard because rational basis review would allow virtually any award of
punitive damages to stand, no matter how large, as long as the award
served a legitimate state interest of deterrence and punishment.' 5  On the
other hand, the Court rejected TXO's suggestion that heightened scrutiny
is the correct standard of review by noting that the judicial process, like
the legislative process, is protected by safeguards to assure that a punitive
damages award is not arbitrary.'5 ' Writing for the plurality, Justice
144. TXO, 113 S. Ct at 2718 (Stevens, ., plurality).
145. Id at 2719.
146. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719 (Stevens, J., plurality); see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text
(discussing the substantive due process clause and the use of rational basis scrutiny in the review of state
economic legislation).
147. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719 (Stevens, J., plurality); supra note 71 (discussing the deference given to
findings of the legislature during review of state economic legislation).
148. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719 (Stevens, J., plurality); see iaL (advocating the use of objective criteria, TXO
provided the Court with a list of proposed objective criteria which, according to TXO, should be compared with
the punitive damages award in this case). The factors included: Awards of punitive damages against other
defendants which were upheld in the same jurisdiction; punitive damages awards upheld in other jurisdictions
for similar conduct; legislative penalty decisions with respect to similar conduct; and the relationship of the
amount of the punitive damages to the amount of the actual damages. I. If a court, after examining the proposed
factors, finds that a punitive damages fine is excessive, it must strike down the award unless there is a
compelling and particularized justification. Id.
149. Id
150. Id.
151. Id at 2719-20 (Stevens, J., plurality); see id. (stating that there were safeguards in thejudicial process
in this case). The safeguards included the jury's impartiality, the fact that the jury's knowledge of the case was
based on the evidence, and the fact that the award was reviewed by the trial judge and the appellate court. Id.
The Court noted that in a trial where fair procedures are followed, a strong presumption of validity is to be
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Stevens also rejected any objective criteria as the sole measure for
determining whether a punitive damages award violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause." 2 According to the plurality, a list
of objective criteria is alone insufficient to determine the validity of a
punitive damages award, because numerous other factors, some of which
are intangible, are relied upon by a jury in making such a decision.1 53
Although objective criteria have been used in determining the validity of
other state practices, Justice Stevens held that the use of objective criteria
is not appropriate to assess whether a punitive damages award is
presumptively unconstitutional."5  Justice Stevens acknowledged,
however, that objective criteria, while not sufficient alone to assess the
constitutionality of punitive damages, can be considered in the overall
analysis. 55
Justice Stevens concluded the plurality's discussion on the standard of
review by restating the general holding of Haslip, that it is not possible for
the Court to satisfy substantive due process by drawing a mathematical
bright line between constitutional and unconstitutional punitive damages
awards. 56 Echoing Haslip, the plurality stated that a general concern of
reasonableness should enter into the analysis of a punitive damages
award.'57 The plurality thus decided to analyze the punitive damages
award against TXO to determine if it was so grossly excessive as to
violate the substantive component of due process. 158
granted to the decision of the jury. Id. at 2720; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24-40
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that there are reasons for suggesting that the presumption of validity in
the jury's decision is irrebuttable if fair procedures have been followed).
152. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality). But see infra notes 159-174 and accompanying text
(discussing arguments of Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor for using objective criteria when deciding the
reasonableness of punitive damages).
153. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality). The United States Supreme Court noted that it is a
straight forward task to draw intra- and interjurisdictiorial comparisons in the penalties imposed for non-violent
repeat felons, as in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291-92 (1983). Id.; see id. (finding that punitive damages
award proceedings deal with facts unique to each case, making it difficult to draw meaningful comparisons
between different cases).
154. l.; see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290-92 (examining objective criteria used to review the penalty
for non-violent repeat felons); see infra notes 270-272 and accompanying text (discussing the use of objective
criteria by courts in criminal trials to assure that sentences are proportional to the crime and to other sentences
for similar crimes).
155. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality).
156. Id.; see supra notes 88-89, 104-106 and accompanying text (discussing the unwillingness of the Court
in Haslip to draw a bright line rule to distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional punitive damages).
157. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality); see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text
(explaining that this test of general reasonableness is the factor set forth in Haslip to evaluate the
constitutionality of punitive damages).
158. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality).
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Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's explanation of the
reasonableness test.'59 In her dissenting opinion, she criticized the
plurality for not establishing any guideposts or instructions to help courts
interpret the reasonableness standard.' 6 According to Justice O'Connor,
the plurality had a duty to provide guidance to courts which are regularly
required to analyze punitive damages awards.' 61  Yet, in Justice
O'Connor's opinion, the plurality did not offer any guidance as to a test
for deciding the constitutionality of punitive damages awards. 162 Instead,
Justice O'Connor approved of the objective criteria test offered by
TXO. 16s She reasoned that punitive damages awards not based on
proportionality have to be based on the personal preferences of the
court.,, Employing objective criteria, according to Justice O'Connor,
provides a barrier to the use of personal preferences in analyzing a
punitive damages award.'65
Justice Kennedy also did not agree with the plurality's discussion of
the substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause in determining
whether the punitive damages award was grossly excessive. 66 Although
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the formulas suggested by
the parties to analyze punitive damages were unsatisfactory, he asserted
that the reasonableness test adopted by the plurality was not an
improvement. 67 In criticizing the plurality's test, Justice Kennedy stated
that the test established no standards which a trial court could use to
decide whether a punitive damages award is excessive. 68 According to
Justice Kennedy, a reviewing trial court can rely only on its own
159. Id. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160. Id at 2731-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. Id at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see id. (recognizing the inability of the Court to discern a
mathematical formula for punitive damages analysis, but maintaining that the Court has a duty to provide
guidance).
162. Id Justice O'Connor argued that if quadruple punitive damages were near the line of constitutionality
in Haslip, then more than 500 times the amount of actual damages is surely over the line. Id at 2732-33
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. Id at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Id; see supra note 148 and accompanying text (listing the objective criteria suggested by TXO).
165. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2732 (O'Connor, 3., dissenting).
166. Id at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
167. Id at 2724-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see supra notes 156-158
and accompanying text (discussing the reasonableness test used by the Court).
168. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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subjective reaction to a punitive damages award because there is nothing
more in the plurality's formulation of a test for constitutionality. 69
Departing from the plurality's approach, Justice Kennedy suggested a
constitutional inquiry that would focus not on the absolute or relative
amount of money awarded in punitive damages, but on the rationale of the
jury in reaching that amount of damages.170 Justice Kennedy explained
that the United States Constitution does not concern itself with any specific
dollar amounts or ratios, but with protecting citizens against arbitrary or
irrational deprivations of property.171 Thus, the only way to ensure this
guarantee, according to Justice Kennedy, is to scrutinize the reasoning of
the jury to avoid bias, passion, or prejudice in rendering a punitive
damages award.172 While not specifying how a court is to analyze a
jury's reasoning, the fact that TXO had acted with malice was enough to
assure Justice Kennedy that the punitive damages award should be
upheld.173 Although expressing some disquiet in affirming the award,
169. Il Justice Kennedy was concerned that the standard advanced by the plurality creates no lawful
restraints on jury excess, yet could create an illusion of judicial certainty, where none in fact existed, which
could discourage legislative intervention to prevent unjust punitive damages awards. Id.
170. Id; see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)
(explaining the need to focus on the process used by the jury in reaching punitive damages awards).
171. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
172. Id at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
173. Id Justice Kennedy differentiated between a punitive damages award against A party who acted with
malice, and an award against a party where the underlying claim was negligence, strict liability, or respondeat
superior. IL He implied that a party must act with malice to have a punitive damages award levied. Id Justice
Kennedy's view that punitive damages awards should not be levied in cases of negligence, respondeat superior
or strict liability is held by some commentators. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958),
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979) (identical provisions) (providing that punitive damages can
be awarded against a principal for acts of the principal's agent only if the principal authorized the doing and
manner of the act, the principal was reckless in hiring an unfit agent, the agent was hired and acting in a
managerial capacity, or the principal ratified or approved the act); see also CAI. CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (West
Supp. 1994) (legislating that an employer shall not be liable for punitive damages from acts of an employee
unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee, employed that person with
disregard for the safety of others, or ratified or authorized the act of the employee); ACTL REPORT, supra note
19, at 16 (finding that there is no justification for holding a party responsible for an act if that party did not
commit or otherwise participate in the act). To punish a person who did not commit wrongful conduct goes
against the purposes of punishment and deterrence of wrongful conduct. led; Symposium: Punitive Damages;
Symposium Discussion, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 199 (Matthew L. Spitzer, ed. 1982) (discussing, if the employer
is already liable for compensatory damages, making the employer liable for punitive damages would be inducing
the employer to take precautions which are beyond the level of efficiency). But see Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co.
v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927) (holding that to find extraordinary liability against those at fault and those
who, although not directly culpable but are in a position to prevent the harm, did not violate due process); Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926) (stating that it does not violate procedural due process for a state
to deprive innocent owners of property in order to influence the conduct of wrongful third parties who are in
the control of the property); Symposium, supra, at 200 (arguing that it is cheaper for employers to police their
employees than to have the state police the employees to assure no wrongdoing). It should be noted that Justice
Kennedy did not object to the award of punitive damages in Haslip, which was based on respondeat superior.
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Justice Kennedy maintained that TXO's malice could have motivated the
jury's award in a legitimate attempt to punish and deter TXO. 174
Nonetheless, the plurality disregarded the arguments of Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, and used the grossly excessive test to evaluate whether the
punitive damages award against TXO was unconstitutional.
C. Punitive Damages Which Are 526 Times the Compensatory
Damages Are Not Grossly Excessive
In attempting to prove that the punitive damages award was grossly
excessive, TXO placed special emphasis on the fact that the punitive
damages award granted to Alliance was over 526 times the amount of the
actual damages award. 75 TXO claimed that since the punitive damages
award in Haslip, which was four times actual damages, was held to be
close to the line of constitutionality, surely 526 times the actual damages
award was over that line.176 TXO maintained that state courts have long
held, for reasons of fundamental fairness, that punitive damages awards
should bear a reasonable relationship to the damages awarded for the
actual injury.177
The Supreme Court, however, recognized that punitive damages should
bear a reasonable relationship not only to the actual damages, as TXO
maintained, but also to the harm which was likely to occur from the
defendant's conduct.17 1 The Court also recognized that Alliance's
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 40-42 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally Theodore
B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., The Constitutional Battle Against Punitive Damages: Where to Go After
TXO, FOR THE DEFENSE, Sept. 1993, at 8 (stating that the Commerce Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause,
and Equal Protection Clause could be used to attack punitive damages in a respondeat superior action).
174. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Kennedy noted that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that TXO had acted through a pattern
and practice of fraud, trickery and deceit and had employed malicious practices. Id.
175. Id at 2721 (Stevens, J., plurality).
176. Ia; see supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing how the four to one ratio of damages in
Haslip was close to the line of constitutionality).
177. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721 (Stevens, J., plurality); see, e.g., Willis & Bros. v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465,
480 (1882) (holding that exemplary damages which were twelve times the amount of actual damages were
clearly excessive and a result of passion or prejudice of the jury); Mobile & Montgoniery R. Co. v. Ashcrft,
48 Ala. 15, 33 (1872) (stating that corporations should not be penalized with damages more than an individual,
and that any punitive damages award should bear proportion to the actual damages sustained); Grant v.
McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447, 448 (1852) (stating that exemplary damages should bear some proportion to the
real damages).
178. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721 (Stevens, J., plurality); see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S.
1, 21 (1991) (approving the Alabama Supreme Court's comparison between the punitive damages award and
the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct); Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1181 (1931) (discussing the importance of using punitive damages to deter conduct which
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projected revenues from the royalty payments, as determined by Alliance,
amounted to between $5 million and $8.3 million, and that TXO's
fraudulent behavior potentially could have reduced the amount of royalties
by millions of dollars.179 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the
dramatic disparity between the level of actual and punitive damages was
not controlling in this case.180 Justice Stevens submitted that the jury
could have considered other factors, such as the TXO's malicious or
fraudulent actions when awarding the punitive damages.1'8  The Court
recognized that while the level of punitive damages in this case was
massive, the damages were not grossly excessive because of the amount
of money potentially at stake, the bad faith of TXO, the fact that TXO had
employed this scheme of fraud in other states, and TXO's wealth.8 2 The
Court questioned, however, the manner in which the wealth of the
defendant was presented to the jury in evidence and in jury
instructions.183
D. Jury Instructions Highlighting Defendant's Wealth Could Cause
Unfair Prejudice
The Court next addressed TXO's additional claim that it was the victim
of fundamentally unfair procedures for assessing punitive damages."'
TXO claimed that its procedural due process rights had been violated
because the jury had not been adequately instructed on the topic of
punitive damages. 5 The plurality specifically declined to make a ruling
has the potential to cause serious injury). A man who shoots a gun into a crowd of people, for example,
damaging only a $10 pair of glasses, should be admonished with punishment as if he had killed or injured
someone. Id. The Court in 7XO examined this example and stated that a jury in this case could return thousands
of dollars in punitive damages to deter future bad acts of this kind, even though the compensatory damages were
only $10. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721; see supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text (discussing the factors used
to evaluate punitive damages awards in Haslip).
179. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722 (Stevens, J., plurality).
180. Id
181. Id
182. Id. at 2722-23 (Stevens, J., plurality); see supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text (highlighting
the pattern of fraud undertaken by TXO).
183. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723 (Stevens, J., plurality).
184. Id.
185. Id. TXO also claimed that the punitive damages award was not adequately reviewed by the trial court
or the appellate court, and that TXO had no advance notice of the possibility of the massive punitive damages.
Id. The Court, however, stated that these claims were without merit. Id; see id. at 2724 (stating that the trial
judge gave TXO an adequate hearing on its post-trial motions, and the only basis for criticizing the trial court's
review was the fact that the judge offered no written opinion on the review). TXO's criticism of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was based largely on the use of the colorful phrases "really mean" and
"really stupid" in the Court's opinion. Id. The criticisms of the trial court and appellate court were not sufficient
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on the claim of inadequate jury instructions because the lower court did
not hear this claim. 86 Justice Stevens, nevertheless, proceeded to analyze
the jury instructions." 7
The plurality noted that the instructions given to the jury in the trial
court differed in two ways from the instructions found adequate in
Haslip.88 First, the trial court instructed the jury to take into account the
wealth of the defendant because a larger penalty might be necessary to
punish a defendant of large means as compared to one of ordinary
means.8 9 Second, the trial court instructed the jury that it could provide
additional compensation to Alliance because of the conduct to which it had
been subjected.'
Justice Stevens submitted that the emphasis placed on TXO's wealth
might have caused undue prejudice, especially since the focus of the
evidence showed that TXO is a large, out-of-state corporation. 9 ' The
plurality pointed out, however, that one of the factors from Haslip which
can be taken into account when assessing punitive damages is the wealth
of the defendant. 92 Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that many states
permit the defendant's wealth to be taken into account when assessing
punitive damages.193 The plurality once again noted, however, that since
to rule that the post trial and appellate review were inadequate. Id. The Court stated that notice had been given
to TXO of the possibility of punitive damages by decisions in past cases. Id.; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 894 app. B (1992) (providing a chart which divides defendants of
punitive damages actions into groups which were "really mean" or "really stupid").
186. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723-24 (Stevens, J., plurality); see Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,
486 U.S. 71, 76-79 (1988) (concluding that claims not raised and passed upon in state courts cannot be reached
or reviewed by the United States Supreme Court).
187. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723-24 (Stevens, J., plurality); see id. at 2723 n.29 (outlining the jury instructions
regarding punitive damages). The instructions advised the jury to consider the nature of the wrongdoing, the
extent of the harm inflicted, the intent of the party committing the act, the wealth of the perpetrator, and any
mitigating circumstances which reduce the amount of damages. Id.
188. Ia. at 2723 (Stevens, J., plurality).
189. Id
190. Id
191. Id
192. I d; see supra notes 100-102 (discussing the Haslip factors, which included the wealth of the
defendant).
193. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723 & n.31 (Stevens, J., plurality); see e.g., Viking Ins. Co. v. Jester, 836 S.W.2d
371,379 (Ark. 1992) (providing that the financial condition of the defendant is a proper matter to consider when
deciding punitive damages); Wagner v. MeDaniels, 459 N.E.2d 561, 564 (Ohio 1984) (maintaining that evidence
of a defendant's net worth may be considered by the fact-finder in determining appropriate punitive damages,
but this evidence is not required); Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 n.3 (S.C. 1991) (holding that in
calculating the amount of punitive damages, the ability of the defendant to pay may be considered); Lunsford
v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988) (finding that the defendant's net worth is relevant in suits which
include exemplary damages); see also Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 110, 813 P.2d 1348, 1351, 284 Cal.
Rptr. 318, 321 (1991) (stating that a reviewing court cannot make a fully informed determination of whether
an award of punitive damages is excessive unless the record contains evidence of the defendant's financial
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TXO had not attacked the constitutionality of the jury instructions in the
highest court of the state, the claim could not be reviewed at the Supreme
Court level.
94
Justice O'Connor's dissent expressed that the jury had been presented
with impermissible factors in deciding the award, most importantly the fact
that the defendant was an out-of-state, wealthy corporation.195 She noted
that jurors are normal citizens who are susceptible to impermissible
influences introduced to them. 96 Especially in the area of punitive
damages, Justice O'Connor maintained that the risk of prejudice, bias, and
caprice remain, and to avoid excessive punitive damages, meaningful jury
safeguards must be in place.' 97 Justice O'Connor, therefore, reasoned that
because of the absence of any other explanation, the punitive damages
award was influenced by TXO's out-of-state status and its wealth.198
E. Justice Scalia Argues that Punitive Damages Are Not Subject to
Substantive Due Process Analysis
Justice Scalia, who was joined by Justice Thomas, concurred with the
decision of the plurality based on the fact that TXO's procedural due
process rights were not violated.' 99 He noted that the jury had been
instructed on the purposes of punitive damages, and that the jury's award
was reviewed by the trial court and the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.2 ° Justice Scalia found that there is a procedural due process
requirement for courts to instruct juries and review the reasonableness of
punitive damages awards.2 '
Departing from the plurality, however, Justice Scalia argued that there
is no substantive due process right to have punitive damages awards
condition); McDonough v. Jorda, 519 A.2d 874, 879 (NJ. 1986) (holding that in assessing exemplary damages,
a jury must take into consideration the wealth of the defendants).
194. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723-24 (Stevens, J., plurality).
195. Id. at 2737 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (submitting that juries have long shown prejudice against
corporations); see Ellis, supra note 3, at 61-62 (propounding that poor jurists will distribute the wealth of rich
corporate defendants in an attempt to put society's wealth into equilibrium).
196. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. lit at 2736 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2739 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199. Id at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
200. I4
201. Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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reviewed for reasonableness.0 2 He accepted that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates certain guarantees of the Bill
of Rights, but was unwilling to state that a review of punitive damages
awards for reasonableness is included within these rights.2 3 According
to Justice Scalia, state courts and legislatures, and not federal courts, have
the ability to eliminate unfairness in the punitive damages award systems
of each state.2 4
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The desire for the United States Supreme Court to develop a clear,
substantive test to determine when a punitive damages award violates
substantive due process was, once again, not realized in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.2 5 Rather, the Court merely used a
general reasonableness test in determining whether the punitive damages
award was grossly excessive, and made it clear that there is not a
mathematical bright line test to use when reviewing punitive damages.
2 °6
202. Id at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia stated that the size of the award
affirmed against TXO will make it more difficult to bring substantive due process challenges against punitive
damages awards because these claims can be disposed of as "no worse than TXO." Id. Justice Scalia implied
that the plurality opinion established a new mathematical ratio of 10-to-I punitive damages to potential harm.
Id.
203. It at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia argued that the Due Process Clause
is not intended to protect against excessive punitive damages, because it would follow that the Due Process
Clause would also protect against excessive fines. let This result, he concluded, would make the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment superfluous. Id
204. Id. at 2727-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
205. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993)
(No. 92-479) (arguing that 7XO be the case where a set standard of review should be developed for punitive
damages); Brief for American Auto. Mfr. Ass'n, at 22, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (suggesting that the Court formulate general standards to help guide state courts
in determining when a punitive damages award is excessive); Cris Carmody, Court Revisits Issue of Punitives,
NAT'L L. REV., Apr. 12, 1993, at 3 (discussing the arguments of parties in 7XO which called for, and
challenged, the erection of a specific test for reviewing punitive damages). But see Brief for Respondent at 2,
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (arguing that drawing a line
for reviewing punitive damages awards would be a throwback, undermining the common law doctrine of
punitive damages which serves fundamental state interests). See generally Olson & Boutrous, supra note 173,
at 2 (demonstrating that TXO added to the confusion of the punitive damages analysis, and did not end the
constitutional inquiry into punitive damages awards).
206. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality); see Hanson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
865 S.W.2d 302, 310-11 (Ky. 1993) (applying the grossly excessive test developed in YXO). Hanson had been
remanded by the United States Supreme Court to be considered after the TXO decision). American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Hanson, 113 S. Ct. 3029. But see Carlough v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1461
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding that after 7X0, in which a punitive damages award 526 times actual damages was
upheld, it cannot be argued with legal certainty that the Constitution imposes any requirement that punitive
damages bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages).
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The Court also left open the question of whether the defendant's wealth
may be offered into evidence and in the jury instructions. 7
Due to the skeletal instructions provided by the plurality, state courts
will have to apply their own substantive and procedural tests when
reviewing punitive damages awards. State courts should make alterations
in their systems for reviewing punitive damages by requiring evidence of
the defendant's wealth to be admitted to the jury.208 States should also
use objective criteria when performing a substantive due process review
of punitive damages awards.2M
A. Evidence of Defendant's Wealth, Within Limits, Should Be Admitted
into Evidence in Cases Involving Punitive Damages
Since the TXO Court left open the issue of introducing evidence of the
defendant's wealth, it will have to be addressed in the future by the
Supreme Court when reviewing jury instructions in punitive damages
award cases. It is a thesis of this Note that evidence of the defendant's
wealth must be introduced to a jury when deciding on punitive damages
because the underlying purposes of punitive damages require it.210 The
introduction of this evidence, however, must be limited.21'
1. Introduction of the Defendant's Wealth into Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) state that all relevant evidence
is admissible.2 2  Evidence, although relevant, may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
207. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723 (Stevens, J., plurality); see id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (finding that state courts are still bereft of any standard by which to compare punitive
punishments to the harm that gave rise to them); id. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality
did not erect a single guidepost to help courts find their way through punitive damages).
208. See infra notes 210-248 and accompanying text (arguing that evidence of the defendant's wealth
should not be excluded from a jury when awarding punitive damages).
209. See infra notes 263-249 and accompanying text (discussing procedural and substantive safeguards
which must be provided by state courts to assure that punitive damages do not violate due process).
210. See infra notes 212-229 (noting that the wealth of the defendant is a necessary part of the analysis
of punitive damages awards). But see Brief for Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Texaco, Inc., at 13-17, TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (arguing that due process prohibits jury
consideration of the defendant's wealth).
211. See infra notes 230-241 and accompanying text (discussing the need to limit the introduction into
evidence of the defendant's wealth in order to avoid undue prejudice).
212. FED. R. EviD. 402 (stating that relevant evidence is generally admissible, while irrelevant evidence
is inadmissible).
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prejudice or of misleading the jury.213 It has been argued that evidence
of the defendant's wealth should be excluded from the jury because of the
possibility of jury prejudice against a wealthy defendant.214 Should
evidence of the defendant's wealth, in cases involving punitive damages
awards, be excluded under the FRE?
Evidence of the defendant's wealth can be compared to provisions
presently existing in the FRE which exclude certain types of highly
prejudicial evidence. FRE 411 excludes evidence of whether a person is
insured, when such evidence is used for determining if the person acted
negligently or wrongfully.215 The purpose of excluding evidence of
insurance is to avoid having the jury base a decision on improper grounds,
such as prejudice against insurance companies.216
A similar argument is found in the plurality and dissenting opinions of
TXO, where it was found that the risk of prejudice to the defendant may
compel the exclusion of defendant's wealth in cases involving punitive
damages.217 Justice Stevens' plurality opinion.noted that the emphasis on
the wealth of the wrongdoer increased the risk that the award may have
been influenced by prejudice.21 8 In the dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor also implied that the evidence of TXO's wealth, coupled with
the comments that TXO was an out-of-state corporation, were
prejudicial.2 9 If the rationale of FRE 411, which excludes a defendant's
213. Id. 403. Relevant evidence may also be excluded if it will confuse the issues of the trial, cause undue
delay, waste time, or needlessly present cumulative evidence. Id.
214. See, e.g., Southern Life and Health Ins. Co., v. Whitman, 358 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1978) (holding
that evidence of the defendant's wealth is highly prejudicial and therefore, inadmissible). The Whitman court
opined that if evidence of the wealth of a defendant is permitted, then evidence of a poor person's lack of wealth
should also be admitted to discourage punitive damages. Id. But see supra note 193 and accompanying text
(isting states which allow or require evidence of the defendant's wealth to be entered in cases involving punitive
damages).
215. FED. R. EvID. 411; see I STEPHEN E. SAL'ZEURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENcE MANUAL 386 (5th ed. 1990) (explaining that the plaintiff is not allowed to offer the evidence on te
theory that because the defendant was insured, the defendant was probably careless). Evidence is likewise
excluded when offered by the defendant to show that since the defendant did not have insurance, he had an
incentive to act carefully. Id.
216. FED. R. EviD. 411, advisory committee's note.
217. See supra notes 184-198 and accompanying text (asserting that Justice Stevens' plurality opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, and Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice White and Justice Souter, questioned the use of the defendant's wealth in the jury instructions).
218. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. CL 2711, 2723 (1993) (Stevens, J., plurality).
219. See id. at 2737 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (advancing that juries think little of extracting large sums
of money from wealthy corporate defendants). Alliance's attorney repeatedly addressed the issue of wealth and
the defendant's out-of-state status during the trial, advising the jury that they could return any award which they
thought was fair. Id at 2738-39. The plaintiff's attorneys also referred to TXO as a greedy bunch of overrich,
gambling, wildcat, high rollers from Texas who would come to town and cheat a community out of money. Id.
The plaintiff's lawyers repeatedly reminded the jury that there were virtually no restrictions to its discretion when
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insured status, is followed, then evidence of the defendant's wealth would
be excluded 'to prevent undue prejudice by jurors in cases involving
punitive damages. Even though excluding evidence of the defendant's
wealth from the jury to avoid prejudice seems logical under the rationale
of FRE 411, a rule excluding this evidence would be contrary to the
purposes of punitive damages and should thus, not be followed.22 °
Many commentators agree that the purpose of punitive damages is to
deter and punish.22' As pointed out in the jury instructions of TXO, the
law recognizes that a larger punitive damages award might be required to
deter a wealthy defendant's actions.222 Therefore, the evidence of the
defendant's wealth must be admitted. Suppose, for example, a plaintiff
received a $1,000 punitive damages judgment for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against a defendant who is worth $20 million.
Obviously, the size of the award would not be sufficient to punish and
deter the defendant from future similar conduct. On the other hand, had the
punitive damages award against the same defendant been $30 million, it
would have been clearly excessive.223 The two principles contained in
this hypothetical, which date back at least to the Magna Carta, are that
punitive damages must punish the wrongdoer with a meaningful penalty,
yet not take all of the defendant's wealth.224 The only way to accomplish
these goals is to admit into evidence the financial position of the defendant.22
deciding punitive damages. Id. at 2739. Justice O'Connor also noted that corporations have long been viewed
with disfavor by jurors, and that jurors may feel privileged to redistribute wealth from wealthy corporations to
needier plaintiffs. Ida at 2737; see Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 IIl. 183, 188 (1869) (stating that juries
generally assess an amount of damages against a corporation which would be extreme if levied against an
individual under the same facts); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (stating that a verdict returned by a biased or prejudiced jury violates due process).
220. See infra notes 221-241 and accompanying text (addressing the introduction of a defendant's wealth
for the purpose of determining punitive damages awards).
221. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (maintaining that the purposes of punitive damages are to
deter and punish).
222. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723 n.29 (Stevens, J., plurality); see Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d
43, 65, 529 P.2d 608, 624, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 200 (1974) (maintaining that the wealthier the wrongdoing
defendant, the larger the award of exemplary damages needs to be in order to accomplish the statutory
objectives).
223. This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts of Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of California,
15 Cal. App. 4th 1426, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (2d Dist. 1992).
224. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (referring to the Magna Carta's requirements that the
defendant be amerced in accordance with the gravity of the offense, but not be deprived of his livelihood).
225. See Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 110,813 P.2d 1348, 1351, 248 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321 (1991)
(stating that a reviewing court cannot make a fully informed decision of whether a punitive damages award was
excessive unless the record contains evidence of the defendant's wealth); McDonough v. Jorda, 519 A.2d 874,
879 (1986) (finding that a defendant's financial condition must be considered because the theory behind punitive
damages is to punish for the past event and to prevent future offenses, and the degree of punishment resulting
from a judgment must be, to some extent, in proportion to the means of the guilty person); see also Robertson
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In TXO, evidence of TXO's wealth was admitted into evidence. 2 6 A
$10 million punitive damages award was levied against a corporation with
a net worth of $2.2 billion.227 Although this satisfies the requirement that
the defendant's wealth be introduced, TXO's right to a trial free from
unnecessary bias and prejudice was violated by the manner in which the
evidence was presented.228 Introduction of evidence of a defendant's
wealth must, therefore, be limited to satisfy procedural due process.229
2. Procedural Limitations on Evidence of a Defendant's Wealth
While evidence of the defendant's wealth is necessary to assure that a
punitive damages award is sufficient to punish the defendant and deter
future wrongful conduct, procedures must be devised to limit the
admittance of the defendant's wealth into evidence to assure that the
defendant receives procedural due process."0 Numerous states have
passed legislation that bifurcates a trial involving punitive damages into
two proceedings, one for liability issues and a second for determination of
the punitive damages award."1 For example, California has adopted a
punitive damages system which allows a defendant to request a protective
order preventing the inclusion of evidence regarding the defendant's
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 91-3717, 1993 WL 532709, at *7 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that the United
States Supreme Court decisions in TXO and Haslip allow for evidence of the defendant's financial worth to be
considered by the jury).
226. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716-17 (Stevens, J., plurality).
227. See id. at 2717 n.9 (finding that TXO's net worth is between $2.2 and $2.5 billion).
228. See id. at 2735 (O'Connor, ., dissenting) (averring that due process does not simply require that a
particular result be substantially acceptable, but that it also must be reached on the basis of permissible
procedural considerations); supra note 219 (discussing the comments made by plaintiff's attorneys which
repeatedly made note of TXO's wealth and out-of-state status); supra note 69 and accompanying text
(maintaining that a person has a right to notice and an adequate hearing to satisfy procedural due process).
229. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2737 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 57 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting
the use of bifurcation of trials, as well as other legislative restraints on punitive damages awards, to separate
punitive damages cases into liability and punitive damages stages); supra notes 212-229 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of defendant's wealth in deciding on a punitive damages award); see supra notes 212-213
and accompanying text (maintaining that the Federal Rules of Evidence will not allow evidence which is unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant).
231. See CAL. Ctv. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002.1(d) (Supp. 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(a) (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (1993); NEv. REv. STAT. § 42.005(3) (1993); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-5(b) (West 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(2)-(4) (1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2315.21(C) (Baldwin 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (1993). Three states have introduced the required
use of bifurcated trial through common law courts. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, No. D-1507, 1994 WI.
27030 at *17 (Tex. Feb. 2, 1994); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992); Campen v.
Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981).
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financial condition until after the trier-of-fact has returned a verdict
awarding actual damages to the plaintiff and finding the defendant guilty
of malice, oppression or fraud.22 The California statute also precludes
pretrial discovery of the defendant's financial condition until the plaintiff
establishes that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the punitive damages claim. 2 3 These safeguards assure that
the defendant will not be unduly prejudiced by the early admittance and
constant repetition of evidence of wealth.' The California procedures
also assure that the defendant will not be unduly subjected to discovery
intrusions into personal assets.23
It is fair to say that the outcome of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp. would have been far different if West Virginia had used
a bifurcated trial. As argued above, evidence of TXO's wealth would have
been necessary to determine the optimal level of punitive damages to
adequately punish and deter. Evidence of the defendant's financial
condition, however, would not have been introduced until a second
proceeding to determine punitive damages.236 Under the California
statute, the hearing on punitive damages would not have been reached until
the jury had returned with a judgment against TXO finding fraud, malice
or oppression. 237 Even though the punitive damages award might have
232. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 3294(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (defining
malice as conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which
is carried out by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others); id. §
3294(c)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (defining oppression as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights); &,L § 3294(c)(3) (West Supp. 1994) (defining
fraud as intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the
intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise
causing injury).
233. CAL. Ctv. CODE § 3295(c) (West Supp. 1994).
234. See ACTL REPORT, -supra note 19, at 18-19 (suggesting that a bifurcated trial structure be employed
by having a separate hearing where evidence of the defendant's wealth is admissible for the purpose of punitive
damages, and thus, avoiding prejudice to the defendant).
235. See d. at 17-18 (suggesting that discovery of evidence regarding a defendant's wealth or financial
condition, for the purpose of proving the amount of punitive damages, should not be permitted without a prima
facie showing that there is a legal basis for such an award). Prohibiting discovery would protect the defendant
from unnecessary intrusions into records and private affairs. Id.
236. See Vasbinder v. Ambach, 926 F.2d 1333, 1344 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that evidence on the
defendant's ability to pay is not admitted or desirable during the liability and compensatory damages phase of
the case, only during the punitive damages phase).
237. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
plurality) (noting that TXO acted in bad faith and was involved in a scheme of fraud and trickery); id. at 2726
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (basing his decision to concur with the plurality
opinion on the fact that TXO had acted with malice).
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been the same, TXO would have been assured that the award was not a
product of undue prejudice.
States, after a timely request is made by a defendant, should be
required to apply safeguards, such as bifurcated trials, to assure that juries
do not use improper prejudice in determining punitive damages
awards.3 8 The safeguards will allow relevant evidence to reach a jury,
but limit that evidence so the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
preserved. Thus, the punitive damages award will more likely be based on
the purposes of punitive damages outlined in the jury instructions than on
undue prejudices by the jury.
Most states already have rules in place which can be applied to the
bifurcation of trials to avoid prejudice." Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 42(b), upon which most of these state laws are based,
allows a court to separate a trial or issue into any number of trials or
issues to avoid prejudice.24 With the general mechanisms already in
place, trial courts have the ability to, and should, allow trials involving
punitive damages to be bifurcated.24'
238. But see Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501, 527-28 ('ex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that a trial court may order a bifurcated trial of any claim or issue to do justice, in the furtherance of
convenience, and to avoid prejudice, yet interpreting Haslip and 7XO to not require the use of a bifurcated trial
system for exemplary damages).
239. Most states' rules of court grant trial courts the discretion to order separate trials on claims or issues
for the purposes of convenience, judicial economy, or to avoid prejudice to the parties. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV.
P 42(b), ALASKA R. Civ. P. 42(b), ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 42(b), ARK. R. Civ. P. 42(b), FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b), GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-42 (1993), HAW. R. Civ. P. 42(b), IDAHO R. Civ. P. 42(b), IOWA R. Civ. P. 186, ME. R.
Civ. P. 42(b), MD. R. Civ. P. 3-503(b), MASS. R. Civ. P. 42(b), MiNl. R. Civ. P. 42.02, Miss. R. Civ. P. 42(b),
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 603 (McKinney 1976), OMO R. Civ. P. 42(b), R.I. R. CiV. P. 42(b), TEX. R. Civ.
P. 174(b), UTAH R. Civ. P. 42(b), WAsH. R. Civ. P. 42(b), W.VA. R. Civ. P. 42(c), Wis. R. Civ. P. 805.05(2).
240. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b); see Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 110 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding
that FRCP 42(b) allows bifurcation of trials when it is determined that the evidence relevant to the appropriate
amount of punitive damages will be prejudicial towards the issue of liability); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming
Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing a trial court's discretion in bifurcation of punitive damages
trials under FRCP 42(b)); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: RuLES OF CivI. PROCEDURE § 2390, at 296-300 (1971 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the use of FRCP
42(b) for the separation of liability issues from those of damages in trials).
241. See National Bank of Commerce v. McNeill Trucking Co., 828 S.W. 584, 590 (Ark. 1992) (Dudley,
J., concurring) (suggesting bifurcation of punitive damages as a procedural safeguard to reduce the risk of
inflammatory evidence coming before the jury); Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1090 (Ariz. 1987)
(Holohan, J., dissenting) (finding that existing civil procedure rules allow for separate trials for claims on any
issue); McCain v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1001, 1002 (Miss. 1986) (authorizing the severance
of the issues of contract damages and punitive damages to prevent evidence of the defendant's net worth to
cause undue prejudice).
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3. States Which Legislate Mathematical Ratios or Caps on
Punitive Damages Should Consider the Defendant's Wealth
The United States Supreme Court refused to set a mathematical bright
line test for determining when a punitive damages award is
constitutional.242 The Court did, however, encourage state courts and
legislatures to design programs to limit punitive damages awards.243
Many states, through statutes, have developed mathematical formulas to set
the maximum level of a punitive damages award.2" Some states have
experimented with placing a cap on punitive damages awards at a set
monetary figure, while others have decided that punitive damages should
not exceed an amount which is a multiple of the actual damages.245
While attempting to limit punitive damages to a figure that does not
violate due process, these mathematical formulas can violate the underlying
purposes of punitive damages unless the defendant's wealth is taken into
consideration.2' In a case where a wrongdoer has substantial wealth, or
the actual damages are low, the numerical ratios and caps could have little
effect on deterring or punishing a person's wrongful conduct.
Suppose, for example, that a very wealthy man throws harmful acid at
a person's face, yet misses, and causes only a few dollars in clothing
damage.247 If a state statute limits punitive damages to a multiple of
actual damages, then the punitive damages award is be limited by this
ratio, and the defendant might not be adequately punished. Similarly, if a
state has a cap on the amount of punitive damages awards, it might not
assure punishing a defendant whose wealth is great. States should thus be
wary of adopting such limits on punitive damages.
To ensure that the wealth of the defendant is taken into consideration,
statutes should permit the allowable level of punitive damages awards to
242. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,2720 (1993) (Stevens, J., plurality).
243. Id at 2727 (Scalia, L, concurring in judgment) (finding that state legislatures and courts have the
power to eliminate unfairness in common law punitive damages systems); id. at 2733 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that states should be permitted to experiment with different methods of reviewing punitive damages
awards); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.11 (1991) (recognizing that there is much
to be said in favor of legislatures making rules to govern punitive damages awards).
244. See supra note 61 (listing state statutes which limit punitive damages by dollar amounts or by ratios
comparing actual damages and punitive damages).
245. Id; see supra note 22-23 and accompanying text (defining multiple damages).
246. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of punitive damages).
247. This hypothetical is based on Brief for American Auto. Mfr. Ass'n, at 23, TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479). See supra note 19 and accompanying text
(discussing the need to deter conduct which has high potential damages, yet fortuitously results in little or no
actual damages).
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increase depending on the defendant's wealth. One model statute
recommends that punitive damages should be limited to twice actual
damages, or $250,000, whichever is greater.248 For the reasons stated
above, this statute would be inadequate because it does not consider the
wealth of the defendant. The statute should add a factor to consider a
wrongdoer's wealth. For example, the statute could limit punitive damages
to twice actual damages, $250,000, or 1/100 of the defendant's net worth,
whichever is greater. As such, only defendants whose net worth is greater
than $25 million would be effected by this statutory ratio of 1/100 of net
worth.
The reason for considering the net worth of the defendant is clear. If
a defendant has, for example, a net worth of $2.2 billion, a punitive
damages award of $250,000 is surely not going to punish and deter future
conduct. A punitive penalty of $22 million, 1/100 the defendant's net
worth, will, however, serve the purposes of punishing and deterring.
Whenever a state legislates substantive limits to punitive damages awards,
consideration must be given to all the underlying purposes of punitive
damages so that a defendant is adequately punished and deterred.
B. Procedural and Substantive Due Process Safeguards Are Required
to Assure that Punitive Damages Awards Are Not Unreasonable
The United States Supreme Court, in TXO, approved of the substantive
and procedural reviews of punitive damages conducted by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. 249 Unfortunately, the Court was not
clear as to what procedures and substantive standards were to be used by
reviewing courts. Hence, it is important to determine what guidelines
should be imposed by state courts when reviewing the constitutionality of
punitive damages after TX0.
1. Proper Procedural Safeguards Will Assure a Trial Free From
Unfair Jury Bias and Prejudice
The United States Supreme Court in TXO and Haslip approved of
procedures ensuring that a punitive damages award is granted adequate
248. ACTL REPORT, supra note 19, at 15.
249. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliances Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
plurality).
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review." By considering both decisions, the constitutionally required
procedures for reviewing punitive damages awards become apparent. First,
jury instructions must include advising the jury that the purpose of punitive
damages is to deter and punish a defendant for conduct which was
malicious or intentional, and not to compensate the plaintiff."51 The jury
should also be instructed that punitive damages are purely
discretionaryY 2 Moreover, as seen above, the wealth of the defendant
should be considered by the jury when deciding the amount of an award
of punitive damages. 5 3
Second, trial courts should review punitive damages awards to assure
that the jury was not misled by undue passion or prejudice.' The Court
in 7XO made special note that as part of a trial court's post verdict review,
the judge must articulate the reasons for interfering with a punitive
damages award so a reviewing appellate court has a complete record.2 55
Finally, the review process must contain an appellate review of punitive
damages awards. 6 The purposes of the appellate review are to assure
250. See id. at 2723-24 (Stevens, J., plurality), Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-21
(1991) (outlining the procedural requirements in punitive damages award review).
251. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723 n.29 (Stevens, J., plurality);. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6 n.1; (explaining that the
jury instructions from both 7XO and Haslip called for these instructions); supra note 19 and accompanying text
(discussing the purposes of punitive damages).
252. See TXO, 113 S. CL at 2723 n.29 (Stevens, J., plurality) (noting that jury discretion in granting
punitive damages was not expressly mentioned in the jury instructions); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6 n.1 (specifying
discretion of the jury in granting punitive damages awards in the instructions). Many model jury instructions
include advising the jury that the awarding of punitive damages is within the discretion of the jury. See ACTL
REPORT, supra note 19, at 28 (suggesting, in model jury instructions, that awarding punitive damages is entirely
within the discretion of the jury if the defendant acted intentionally, outrageously, or with malice); EDWARD J.
DEvrrr, CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, MICHAEL A. WOLFF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 345-46
(West 1987) (recommending federal jury instructions to include that awarding punitive damages is a matter
exclusively within the province of the jury); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 108-09 (West Supp. 1993) (noting that it is within the discretion of the jury to award punitive
damages).
253. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723 n.29 (Stevens, J., plurality) (using the wealth of the defendant in the jury
instructions); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22 (affirming the use of the wealth of the defendant by the appellate court to
review a punitive damages award); supra notes 210-248 and accompanying text (arguing that knowledge of the
wealth of the defendant is necessary when the jury is deciding on a punitive damages award).
254. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (Stevens, J., plurality); see Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20 (citing Hammond v. City
of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (1986)) (stating that a trial judge is better positioned than appellate judges
to review a punitive damages award, because the trial judge observes the parties and other facets of a trial which
are not captured in an appellate record).
255. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (Stevens, J., plurality) (affirming the need for the trial court to articulate its
review of the punitive damages award). The United States Supreme Court criticized the West Virginia trial court
for not making a record of why it upheld the punitive damages award, but stated that the lack of trial court
record was not a constitutional violation. d; see Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 931-32, 582 P.2d
980, 993, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 402 (1978) (requiring a trial judge to furnish a clear and concise statement of the
reasons for a ruling on a punitive damages award).
256. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (Stevens, J., plurality).
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that there are sufficient constraints on the fact-finders, and to provide an
additional check on the discretion of the trial court's post verdict
review.27
Even though the Supreme Court approved of the use of post trial and
appellate reviews in both TXO and Haslip, the use of these reviews was
never strictly required by the Court." The United States Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari in a case to decide whether the denial of any
judicial review of punitive damages verdicts for excessiveness violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Court in
Haslip found it proper to have constraints on jury awarded punitive
damages through judicial review, and implied that some sort of review was
necessary.260 The plurality in TXO, along with the concurring and
dissenting opinions, also expressed language which seems to necessitate
261the use of post verdict review. It is probable that the Supreme Court
257. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21; see icL at 21 (finding that taking into account the reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the potential as well as actual damages was appropriate when analyzing
punitive damages); Herman v. Sunshine Chemical Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081, 1085-86 (1993) (holding,
in light of TXO, that due process, at a minimum, requires an appellate review of punitive damages awards to
assure reasonableness); supra notes 143-158 and accompanying text (deciding on the appropriate substantive
standard of review to be applied by the TXO Court).
258. But see TX0, 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (Stevens, J., plurality) (failing to specifically require a post-verdict
trial court review); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20 (approving of the Alabama procedural review requirements as a
meaningful and adequate review of punitive damages, but not mandating them for state use).
259. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Jan.
14, 1994) (No. 93-644). See 62 U.S.L.W. 3464-65 (discussing the questions presented in the Honda case). Honda
Motor Co. is challenging a $5.9 million punitive damages award levied against them in a products liability
action, claiming that a state must conduct a post trial review of punitive damages awards. See Honda, 851 P.2d
at 1085; see also Claudia Macachlan, High Court Takes Another Look at Punitive Damages, NAT'L L. REV.,
Jan. 31, 1994, at 17 (stating that the United States Supreme Court granted review in Oberg because Oregon is
the only state which interprets its constitution to preclude judicial review of punitive damages awards to decide
if they are excessive). The Oregon Supreme Court did not interpret Haslip to require post verdict review, and
it denied Honda's petition for reconsideration of the case after TXO. Id. at 26.
260. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22 (1991).
261. See 7XO, 133 S. Ct. at 2724 (Stevens, J., plurality) (approving of the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals' procedures which included post trial and appellate review of the punitive damages award); id. at
2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that the procedures used in 7XO
fulfilled the constitutional requirement of due process); id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that
procedural due process requires judicial review of punitive damages awards for reasonableness); id. at 2731
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding that judicial intervention is necessary in cases of punitive damages awards
to assure that they are proportionate). But see id. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (implying that in cases of products liability, where there is no actual malice on the part of the
defendant, punitive damages awards may not be appropriate); supra note 173 (discussing arguments for and
against allowing punitive damages awards for products liability and vicarious liability cases).
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will find that a judicial post verdict review is required to afford due
process to a party.262
2. Substantive Review of Punitive Damages Awards for Reason-
ableness Should Contain Objective .Criteria
The plurality opinion in TXO lacks objective criteria for trial and
appellate courts to follow when substantively analyzing the reasonableness
or excessiveness of a punitive damages award.263 The plurality used a
nebulous test in determining that the punitive damages award was not
grossly excessive, but offered very little to explain how to determine when
an award is grossly excessive.2' The factors outlined by the Supreme
Court in Haslip, and followed in 7XO, allow the reasonableness of punitive
damages awards to be based on a judge's subjective views and personal
beliefs.26' These factors are not sufficient for judges to use when
reviewing a punitive damages award.2
Instead, objective criteria should be used to aid judges in deciding if
an award is excessive.267 The Court held, though, that there is no
262. See David G. Savage, Court to Revive Issue of Large Punitive Damages, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1994,
at 24 (postulating that the Supreme Court will confirm that lower court judges must review punitive damages
verdicts to ensure that they are not excessive). But see Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide on a Right of
Review of a Jury's Award, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1994, at 9 (stating that the decision in Honda might be narrow,
limited only to Oregon's post verdict review of punitive damages).
263. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 2731-32
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
264. Il at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality).
265. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see'id. at 2722 (stating that the money potentially at stake, the
bad faith of TXO, TXO's wealth, and the fact that TXO's fraud was part of a continuing pattern of fraud and
trickery were the factors used to persuade the Court that the punitive damages award was not excessive); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991) (listing the factors used by a court to determine if a
punitive damages award is excessive); supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing the factors used by
the Court in 7XO); cf Hanson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 865 S.W.2d 302, 310-11 (Ky. 1993) (applying
the TXO factors to determine that an award was not grossly excessive). But see Heil-Quaker Corp. v. Miseher
Corp., 863 S.W.2d 210,218 (Tex. App. 1993) (considering the potential harm of the defendant's conduct toward
the intended victims and other third parties as appropriate factors to consider in assessing punitive damages
awards after TXO); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501, 524 (Tex. App. 1993) (interpreting the
factors from 7XO to include: the relationship between actual and exemplary damages; the relationship between
exemplary damages and the harm caused and the potential harm; the financial position of the defendant; adequate
jury instructions; and other intangible factors unique to a particular case).
266. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980) (holding that constitutional judgments should
not be merely the subjective views of individual judges, but should be informed by objective factors whenever
possible).
267. See 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence as probative as the
objective should not be disregarded when analyzing punitive damages awards); id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (finding that a test for the excessiveness of a punitive damages
award can not be accomplished without criteria to which to compare it). Justice Kennedy argued that to ask if
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objective mathematical ratio for courts to use when assessing punitive
damages awards.268 Therefore, comparative factors should be used to
allow judges to compare a punitive damages award for a wrongful action
against other awards for similar conduct in other cases.269
An analogy can be drawn between the use of objective criteria in
reviewing punitive damages awards with the use of objective criteria in
criminal sentencing. In criminal trials, the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that verdicts be proportional to the
crime committed.270  When reviewing criminal sentences for
proportionality, courts are guided by objective criteria.27 If a court finds
that a criminal sentence is harsher than the sentence for a more serious
crime, then that is an indication that the penalty may be excessive.272
Thus, due to the quasi-criminal nature of punitive damages, objective
criteria should also be used when reviewing punitive damages awards as
an indicator that an award is excessive.273 When a punitive damages
award is not proportional to other awards in the same jurisdiction, and in
other jurisdictions, it is evidence of an excessive award.274
a particular award is excessive is begging the question unless you have something to which to compare it. Id.
268. See id. at 2720 (Stevens, J., plurality) (putting to rest the idea that Haslip established a strict four-to-
one mathematical ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages by stating that there was no bright
line between constitutional and unconstitutional punitive damages awards). But see id. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (implying that the plurality developed a new ratio of 10-to-1 punitive damages to
potential damages).
269. Id. at 2732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
270. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (holding that
a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted). In Solem,
the sentence of life imprisonment without chance for parole was found to be excessive for a defendant who had
committed six non-violent felonies. Id at 303. Life imprisonment without chance of parol was reserved only for
Class One Felonies in South Dakota, but a repeat offender statute made Helm subject to the sentence. Id. at 281.
But see Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment does not limit an award of punitive damages in a civil suit between private parties).
See supra note 64 (discussing Eighth Amendment arguments made against punitive damages).
271. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92 (listing the objective criteria to include the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty, sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions).
272. IM at 290-92.
273. See SCHLUErER & REDDENsupra note 19, at 49-52 (addressing punitive damages awards as quasi-
criminal sanctions).
274. The plurality, as well as four other Justices, agreed that objective criteria could be useful to evaluate
punitive damages awards. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1993)
(Stevens, J., plurality) (stating that objective criteria might be useful when evaluating punitive damages awards);
i&. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (finding that objective criteria would
be helpful in ascertaining whether a jury stripped a party of its property in an arbitrary way); id. at 2732
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process requires judges to engage in objective review of punitive
damages awards to disclose great disproportions). Courts have already held after TXO that objective criteria are
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It is not suggested that reviewing punitive damages with objective
criteria for proportionality should be the only test for deciding the
reasonableness of punitive damages. The factors laid out by Haslip are also
indicators to trial and appellate courts of excessive awards.275 It is
important, however, for trial courts to examine all factors which might
show that an award was based on improper juror passion or prejudice, and
not disregard any such factor which contains probative evidence of
excessiveness.276 A proportionality analysis of punitive damages awards
can be highly probative when determining if an award is excessive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp. avoided creating standards for courts to use
when analyzing the reasonableness of a punitive damages award. It can be
inferred from this that the Court does not plan to create any formal
substantive test for reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards under due process. By dodging the issue of creating an objective
test for gross excessiveness or reasonableness, the Court has left the door
open for continued debate on punitive damages.
Since it is clear that the Supreme Court is unwilling to develop such
a test, states should take the initiative to develop a test to assure that no
punitive damages award is levied based on bias or prejudice. Regulated
evidence of the defendant's wealth should be entered into jury instructions
to enable the jury to set optimal punitive damages figures. Judges and
appellate courts should use objective criteria when reviewing punitive
damages awards so that, they too, can set a proportionately fair award.
Punitive damages, much to the dismay of their critics, are firmly rooted in
American jurisprudence. Only by creating new standards for their
appropriate to examine when reviewing punitive damages awards. See Dunn v. Hovic, I F.3d 1371, 1391 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding, after TXO, that the amount of previous punitive damages awards should be taken into
consideration when determining the correct amount of a punitive award); Datskow v. Teledyne Continental
Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 690 n.6 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (interpreting TXO to allow for comparison
of a punitive damages award to punitive damages awards in other cases). The comparison made is treated as
instructive to the court, but not binding. IL
275. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (listing the factors used by the Haslip Court to
determine if a punitive damages awards was excessive).
276. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2733 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the punitive damages award in
7XO was 20 times larger than any punitive damages award ever in West Virginia; was 10 times larger than the
largest punitive damages award for the same tort in any jurisdiction; and was larger than authorized civil and
criminal penalties for similar offenses).
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assessment can it be assured that the purposes of punitive damages are
served, and that the due process rights of parties are not violated.
Michael J. Pepek
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